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THE “PEOPLE’S TOTAL WAR ON COVID-19”: URBAN 
PANDEMIC MANAGEMENT THROUGH (NON-)LAW 
IN WUHAN, CHINA 
Philipp Renninger† 
Abstract: Although COVID-19 was first detected in the People’s Republic of 
China, the pandemic now appears contained there. Western and Chinese media 
attribute this apparent success to the central level of the Chinese state and the 
Communist Party. However, this article reveals that local entities provided critical 
contributions to China’s COVID-19 management, particularly in the pandemic’s first 
epicenter: Wuhan city in Hubei province. Chinese cities like Wuhan can fight public 
health emergencies through legal and nonlegal instruments. Although Wuhan had 
prepared for possible pandemics, its existing plans, institutions, and warning systems 
initially failed against COVID-19. The city did not contain the viral outbreak 
beginning in November 2019. As a result, Wuhan officials were forced to use strict 
measures to manage the COVID-19 pandemic. From January 23, 2020, a lockdown 
cordoned off the city, and from February 10, a closed management of neighborhoods 
introduced a curfew-like shutdown.  
These two cordons sanitaires and other so-called normative documents were 
imposed by Wuhan’s own COVID-19 Headquarters, a municipal mixed party–state 
organ. Still, the central level must approve—or even directly command—all 
fundamental decisions of local COVID-19 management. The center controls local 
entities like Wuhan not through channels of the state but through the vertical and 
horizontal conduits of the Communist Party, treating “the whole country as a chess 
game.” China’s “COVID-19 chess” has proven itself an effective method of pandemic 
containment. However, this central–local “chess game” yielded detrimental effects for 
many individuals within and outside Wuhan. The reason is that China’s central level, 
aiming at eliminating COVID-19 instead of merely flattening the curve, neither 
requires Wuhan to contain COVID-19 proportionately and balanced, nor allows 
individuals to challenge these containment measures in court. Therefore, without being 
held accountable, Wuhan could encroach on myriad rights and freedoms for millions 
of individuals for several months. And despite subsequent easing, China’s “people’s 
total war” against COVID-19 continues—but its focus has shifted. The strictest 
containment measures now apply to foreign nationals and Chinese citizens returning 
from abroad, as China has drawn a third cordon sanitaire around its national borders. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What began in the urban and local realm now affects the whole globe: 
the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), first detected in the city of 
Wuhan in the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.).1 The World Health 
Organization (WHO) determined COVID-19 was a “public health 
emergency of international concern” on January 30, 2020,2 and a pandemic 
on March 11, 2020.3 COVID-19 rapidly developed into a crisis affecting 
almost every country in the world. This crisis is holistic—and so must be 
its answers. On the one hand, the COVID-19 pandemic hits all areas of 
governance, not only the health sector but also a state’s economy, culture, 
politics, and legal systems. Hence, COVID-19 management must 
encompass preparation and response, prevention, and control, in all these 
areas of governance. On the other hand, the COVID-19 pandemic poses 
challenges to all governmental organs and entities. Thus, COVID-19 
management must be undertaken horizontally by all branches and 
vertically by all levels of government, from national and international 
down to subnational, local entities. Therefore, the urban and local realm, 
where COVID-19 first started, can also contribute to solving the global 
crisis caused by COVID-19. This contribution of cities is particularly 
important because mankind has entered the “urban age” with more than 
half of the world’s population living in cities.4  
In China, central authorities have emphasized the importance of 
cities and other local entities for local, national, and international COVID-
19 management.5 This particularly holds true for the first epicenter of the 
 
 
1  See Kristian G. Andersen et al., The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2, 26 NATURE MED. 450, 
450 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-020-0820-9; Huihui Wang et al., The Genetic Sequence, 
Origin, and Diagnosis of SARS-CoV-2, 39 EUR. J. CLIN. MICROBIOL. INFECT. DIS. 1629, 1629–30 (2020), 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10096-020-03899-4. 
2  Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General, Statement on IHR Emergency 
Committee on Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) (Jan. 30, 2020), 
https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-statement-on-ihr-emergency-
committee-on-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov). This declaration was based on WHO, International 
Health Regulations (July 25, 1969, last rev’d May 23, 2005), https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/24
6107, art. 12, § 1 [hereinafter IHR]. 
3  Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 (Mar. 11, 
2020), https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-
briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020. This declaration was based on WHO, Pandemic Influenza Risk 
Management: A WHO guide to inform & harmonize national & international pandemic preparedness 
and response, at 25–26, U.N. Doc. WHO/WHE/IHM/GIP/2017.1 (May 2017), 
https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/259893.  
4  U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFF., POPULATION DIV. (UNDESA), WORLD URBANIZATION 
PROSPECTS: THE 2018 REVISION, at xix, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/420 (2019), 
https://population.un.org/wup/Publications/Files/WUP2018-Report.pdf.  
5  Xi Jinping (习近平), Zai Hubeisheng Kaocha Xinguan Feiyan Yiqing Fangkong Gongzuoshi 
de Jianghua (在湖北省考察新冠肺炎疫情防控工作时的讲话) [Speech When Inspecting the COVID-
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outbreak: Wuhan city in Hubei province. Wuhan’s “defense war,” 
“people’s war,” and “total war,”6 on the coronavirus has been eulogized by 
the WHO as “the most ambitious, agile and aggressive disease containment 
effort in history.”7 Indeed, this urban containment effort appears highly 
effective, as COVID-19 cases in Wuhan, Hubei, and China officially 
stagnated.8 As of December 2020, there are no signs of a second COVID-
19 wave in China.9 But how did this success come about? What powers do 
Chinese cities like Wuhan possess to contain—that is, prepare for and 
respond to—emergencies, diseases, and pandemics in general? And what 
special instruments and institutions has Wuhan created to manage the 
COVID-19 outbreak? Are these tools legal or nonlegal in nature, state or 
party origin, central or local design—and what difference does this make? 
How do these tools enable urban pandemic management to realize its aims 
of prevention and control in containing public health emergencies? And do 
they render Wuhan’s COVID-19 containment lawful under national and 
international law, as well as proportionate in relation to its encroachment 
on myriad rights and freedoms of millions of individuals for several 
months?  
Answers to these questions determine whether Wuhan serves as a 
role model—or as a cautionary tale that “great cities” are “pestilential” both 
to “the health and the liberties of man,” as Thomas Jefferson opined.10 This 
article illustrates the central–local, party–state, and law–nonlaw relations 
in the P.R.C., which are crucial for understanding the Chinese system, both 
in general and during the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, this article 
 
 
19 Prevention and Control Work in Hubei Province], 2020 QIUSHI (求是), no. 7 (Mar. 10, 2020) 
http://qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2020-03/31/c_1125791549.htm.  
6  Hu Min (胡敏), Yi Geng Jia Jianding de Xinxin Daying Yiqing Fangkong Zujizhan (以更坚定
的信心打赢疫情防控阻击战) [Win the Blockade War of Pandemic Prevention and Control With Firmer 
Confidence], RENMIN RIBAO ( 人 民 日 报 ) [PEOPLE’S DAILY] (Feb. 20, 2020), 
https://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2020-02/20/nw.D110000renmrb_20200220_4-09.htm (quoting 
Xi Jinping alluding to the “(Defense) Battle of Wuhan” of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1938). 
7  WHO, Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), at 
16 (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-mission-on-
covid-19---final-report-1100hr-28feb2020-11mar-update.pdf?sfvrsn=1a13fda0_2&download=true.  
8  Wuhan Mun. Health Comm’n (WHC), Wuhanshi Xinguan Feiyan Yiqing Dongtai (2020 Nian 
11 Yue 23 Ri) (武汉市新冠肺炎疫情动态 (2020 年 11 月 23 日)) [COVID-19 Developments in 
Wuhan City (Nov. 23, 2020)] (Nov. 24, 2020), http://wjw.wuhan.gov.cn/ztzl_28/fk/tzgg/202011/t2020
1124_1517905.shtml; Nat’l Health Comm’n (NHC), Jiezhi 11 Yue 23 Ri 24 Shi Xinxing Guanzhuang 
Bingdu Feiyan Yiqing Zuixin Qingkuang (截至 11 月 23 日 24 时新型冠状病毒肺炎疫情最新情况) 
[Latest COVID-19 Situation as of 24:00 on Nov. 23] (Nov. 23, 2020), 
http://www.nhc.gov.cn/xcs/yqtb/202011/084d24bd86ac4a33953c46a23e078304.shtml.  
9  Contrary to the predictions of Zhang Wenhong, Shanghai Medical Treatment Expert Group 
Leader. See Second COVID-19 Wave in China ‘Inevitable’: Top Experts, GLOBAL TIMES (Sept. 21, 2020), 
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1201572.shtml. 
10  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Rush (Sept. 23, 1800) in 32 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 166 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., Princeton U. Press 2005).  
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also sheds light on the “new normal” under Xi Jinping and how it relates 
to the supposed “Chinese characteristics” of the P.R.C.’s system. Finally, 
this article reveals what cities and local entities worldwide can learn from 
Wuhan’s COVID-19 experience. 
I. FOUNDATION: CENTRAL–LOCAL, PARTY–STATE, AND POLITICAL–
LEGAL SYSTEM 
Western media reports on Chinese COVID-19 containment often 
attribute the pandemic measures to the central level in Beijing.11 These 
reports are inaccurate. First, measures can extend from legal to nonlegal, 
state to party, abstract to concrete, and general to individual instruments. 
Second, measures are predominantly local in nature because they have 
been issued by local entities, like Wuhan, and vary heavily between these 
local entities.12 
A. Central and Local, Party and State 
Such local diversity in COVID-19 management prima vista hardly 
seems surprising. The P.R.C. is the world’s most populous country forming 
a complex central–local system. 13  This system features one central, 
national level and four local levels in the following hierarchy: (1) provinces 
(second level), (2) prefectures and cities (third level), (3) counties and city 
districts (fourth level), and (4) townships and streets (fifth level). Below 
the local levels lies the “basic” or “grassroots level”: villages, residential 
communities, and neighborhoods.  
Nevertheless, local regulatory diversity in China is anything but self-
evident because China’s central–local and party–state system is 
pronouncedly centralist. The P.R.C. is the world’s largest unitary state and 
rejects federalism as one of five political “taboos.”14 Therefore, according 
to its constitution and the Organization Law, only the central, national level 
 
 
11  E.g., Walter R. Mead, China Is the Real Sick Man of Asia, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2020), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-is-the-real-sick-man-of-asia-11580773677. 
12  Interview with Gauden Galea, WHO Representative to China, China Shows COVID-19 
Responses Must be Tailored to the Local Context, WHO/EUROPE (Apr. 3, 2020), 
https://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-emergencies/pages/news/news/2020/04/china-shows-
covid-19-responses-must-be-tailored-to-the-local-context.  
13  See JAE HO CHUNG, CENTRIFUGAL EMPIRE: CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS IN CHINA 34 (2016). 
14  The other four taboos are “multi-party rotation government,” a “pluralization of leading 
thoughts,” a bicameral system, and privatization. See Wu Bangguo, former NPC Standing Comm. 
Chairman, Women Bugao Duodang Lunliu Zhizheng, Bugao Lianbangzhi, Bugao Siyouhua (我们不搞
多党轮流执政 不搞联邦制 不搞私有化) [We Must Not Engage in Multi-Party Rotation Government, 
Federalism, and Privatization], ZHONGGUO RENDAWANG (中国人大网) [NPC ONLINE] (Mar. 11, 2011), 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/npc/dbdhhy/11_4/2011-03/10/content_1640332.htm. 
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has statehood.15 But, local entities are structured similarly to the central 
level. All entities comprise a “quasi-legislative” assembly like Wuhan’s 
Municipal People’s Congress (MPC) and its Standing Committee,16 and a 
“quasi-executive” government like Wuhan’s Municipal People’s 
Government. 17  These state organs merely represent “quasi-branches” 
because the P.R.C. does not recognize a separation of powers, but only 
their “division of labor.” 18  According to the “democratic centralism” 
principle, local congresses and governments are accountable and bound to 
all higher state-level commands—and ultimately to the central level.19 The 
state center thus exercises “unified leadership” over the whole state 
administration.20  
This central leadership is combined with a second, even more, 
important type of leadership: the all-embracing leadership of the party over 
the state. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership is enshrined in both 
party norms and state norms.21 The CCP Statute summarizes: “[t]he party 
leads on everything,” on “government, army, society, and education” in 
“east, west, south, and north”—that is, on all horizontal quasi-branches and 
all vertical levels of government.22 Therefore, state organs are subordinate 
to CCP organs.23  
Party leadership over the state is exerted via two means. First, 
through separate party organs. The most important party organs are the 
CCP Central Committee, Politburo, and its Standing Committee on the 
 
 
15  XIANFA art. 3, § 4 (2018) (China); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Difang Geji Renmin Daibiao 
Dahui he Difang Geji Renmin Zhengfu Zuzhifa (中华人民共和国地方各级人民代表大会和地方各级
人民政府组织法) [P.R.C. Organization Law of Local People’s Congresses and Governments at All 
Levels] (July 1, 1979, last amended Aug. 29, 2015), CLI.1.55744, art. 1 [hereinafter Organization Law]. 
16  See XIANFA art. 96, §§ 1, 2; Organization Law arts. 4, 40. 
17  See XIANFA art. 96, art. 105; Organization Law art. 4, art. 54. 
18  ZHONGGUO FALV GAILUN (中国法律概论) [INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW] 19 (Zhang 
Guangjie (张光杰) ed., 2009). 
19  XIANFA art. 3, § 1; see XIAODAN ZHANG, STUFENORDNUNG UND VERFAHREN DER SETZUNG 
VON RECHTSNORMEN IN DER VOLKSREPUBLIK CHINA [HIERARCHY AND ENACTMENT PROCEDURE OF 
LEGAL NORMS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 122, 153 (2017). 
20  XIANFA art. 3, § 4, art. 110, § 2:2; Organization Law art. 55, § 2. 
21  XIANFA art. 1, § 2:2; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifafa (中华人民共和国立法法) [P.R.C. 
Legislation Law] (Mar. 15, 2000, amended Mar. 15, 2015), CLI.1.245693, art. 3 [hereinafter Legislation 
Law]. 
22  Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangcheng (中国共产党章程) [Statute of the Chinese Communist 
Party] (Sept. 6, 1982, last rev’d Oct. 24, 2017), CLI.16.303854, gen. progr., § 25:2 [hereinafter CCP 
Statute]; see Nis Grünberg & Katja Drinhausen, The Party Leads on Everything: China’s Changing 
Governance in Xi Jinping’s New Era, CHINA MONITOR (Sept. 24, 2019), 
https://merics.org/sites/default/files/2020-05/The%20Party%20leads%20on%20everything_0.pdf.  
23  See Xin He, The Party’s Leadership as a Living Constitution in China, 42 HONG KONG L.J. 73, 
75–76 (2012); XI JINPING (习近平), XI JINPING XINSHIDAI ZHONGGUO TESE SHEHUI ZHUYI SIXIANG 
SANSHI JIANG (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想三十讲) [THIRTY TALKS ON XI JINPING THOUGHT ON 
SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS FOR A NEW ERA] 74 (Zhonggong Zhongyang Xuanchuanbu 
(中共中央宣传部) [CCP Publicity Dep’t] ed., 2018). 
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national level,24 followed by local party committees on every subnational 
level.25 Vertically, local party committees are subordinate to central party 
organs because the “democratic centralism” principle applies within the 
CCP too.26 Horizontally, the same person typically leads both the central 
party organs and central state organs. For example, Xi Jinping has served, 
inter alia, as the General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee since 
2012 and the President of the P.R.C. since 2013.27 In contrast, local-level 
party committee leaders are not identical to local state leaders. Rather, they 
are superior to them. This external party–state hierarchy results from the 
internal party hierarchy.28  In Wuhan, Mayor Zhou Xianwang, head of 
Wuhan’s Municipal People’s Government, is subordinate to Party 
Secretary Wang Zhonglin, head of Wuhan’s CCP Committee, because 
Zhou merely serves as Wuhan’s Deputy Party Secretary.29 Moreover, most 
other members of Wuhan’s municipal state organs, including courts, are 
CCP members or even party cadres.30  
Second, CPP leadership is exerted through party groups. These 
groups exist inside every state organ and many other “non-party 
organizations.”31 They both “ensure that party norms are implemented” 
and “make major decisions within this state organ.”32 The organ-internal 
party group leader generally holds the chief title for their respective state 
organ as well. In Wuhan, for example, Mayor Zhou also serves as the 
Secretary of the CCP Party Group of Wuhan’s Municipal People’s 
Government.33 These party groups are the “leadership core” of any Chinese 
state organ.34  
B. Cities and Centralist Governance 
In China’s central–local and party–state system, neither the P.R.C. 
Constitution nor the CCP Statute provides for the third, prefectural level. 
 
 
24  CCP Statute art. 22–23. 
25  CCP Statute art. 25. 
26  CCP Statute gen. progr., § 24:4, art. 10; see ZHANG, supra note 19, 122, 153. 
27  Xi Jinping Tongzhi Jianli (习近平同志简历) [Comrade Xi Jinping’s CV], XINHUAWANG (新华
网 ) [XINHUANET] (Oct. 25, 2017), http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/leaders/2017-
10/25/c_1121856289.htm. 
28  See Wei Cui & Jiang Wan, When Do Chinese Subnational Governments Make Law? 6 (Working 
Paper on file with the Allard Research Commons, Nov. 18, 2019), 
https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs/513/.  
29  See CCP Statute art. 25. 
30  See Melanie Manion, Authoritarian Parochialism: Local Congressional Representation in 
China, 218 CHINA Q. 311, 312 (2014). 
31  CCP Statute art. 48, § 1. 
32  Id. art. 48, § 3. 
33  See id. art. 48. 
34  Id. art. 48, § 2. 
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But both state and party law mention the main entity this prefectural level 
consists of—“cities with districts” like Wuhan. 35  However, these 
prefectural-level cities do not enjoy broad self-government authority or 
“home rule” like in some European countries and United States’ states.36 
Such local autonomy is merely granted to grassroots-level neighborhoods, 
residential communities, and villages inside Wuhan. 37  Moreover, 
prefectural-level cities were never conceptualized as municipalities or 
“communes,”38 but as “political-administrative units” dispatched by the 
center to control the surrounding countryside.39 For example, in terms of 
territory, Wuhan encompasses extensive rural areas and thus covers an 
administrative area (8,500 km²) much larger than its urbanized core (800 
km²).40 In terms of population, Wuhan accommodates 11.2 million de facto 
inhabitants, over nine million of them in the urbanized core.41 Amongst 
urban dwellers, nine million possess a Wuhan hukou,42 more than doubling 
the prefectural level’s average of four million de jure inhabitants.43  
Despite their enormous size, Chinese cities have been governed for 
decades through central stipulations that “cut with one knife,” that is, with 
a standardized approach for every city in the entire country.44 In times of 
crisis, most China scholarship finds that the decision-making process 
becomes increasingly centralized.45 However, during the coronavirus crisis, 
the center refused to apply the same rules and policies to all local entities.46 
 
 
35  See XIANFA art. 97, § 1, art. 100, § 2; Organization Law art. 5, § 1, art. 7, § 2; CCP Statute 
art. 25, § 1, art. 27, § 1. 
36  For self-government in Germany, see MAHENDRA P. SINGH, GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 27 
(1985); For home-rule in the U.S., see BJÖRN HOPPENSTEDT, KOMMUNALE SELBSTVERWALTUNG IN DEN 
USA [MUNICIPAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S.] 57–83 (2007); see CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM 84 
(Sebastian Heilmann ed., 2016).  
37  XIANFA art. 111; see BJÖRN ALPERMANN, DER STAAT IM DORF [THE STATE IN THE VILLAGE] 
43 (2001). 
38  For Gemeinden in German-speaking countries, see SINGH, supra note 36, at 14. 
39  DIETER HASSENPFLUG, THE URBAN CODE OF CHINA 145 (Mark Kammerbauer trans., 
Birkhäuser 2010). 
40  Wuhanshi Tongjiju (武汉市统计局) [Wuhan Statistical Bureau], 2019 Nian Wuhanshi Guomin 
Jingji he Shehui Fazhan Tongji Gongbao (2019 年武汉市国民经济和社会发展统计公报) [Wuhan 
National Economy and Social Development Statistical Bulletin for 2019], http://tjj.wuhan.gov.cn/tjfw/t
jgb/202004/t20200429_1191417.shtml (Mar. 29, 2020); see UNDESA, supra note 4, at 61. 
41  Wuhanshi Tongjiju, supra note 40. 
42  The Hukou (户口) or Huji (户籍) system describes the de jure household registration of Chinese 
citizens in local entities, which is still restricted; see UNDESA, supra note 4, at 61. 
43  Manion, supra note 30, at 314. 
44  CHUNG, supra note 13, at 58 (“Yi Dao Qie” (“一刀切”)). 
45  CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM, supra note 36, at 147, 150. 
46  Xi Jinping (习近平), Zai Tongchou Tuijin Xinguan Feiyan Yiqing Fangkong he Jingji Shenhui 
Fazhan Gongzuo Bushu Huiyi shang de Jianghua (在统筹推进新冠肺炎疫情防控和经济社会发展工
作部署会议上的讲话) [Speech at the Conference for Overall Planning and Promoting the Deployment 
of COVID-19 Prevention and Control and Economic and Social Development Work], 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-02/24/content_5482502.htm (Feb. 23, 2020). 
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Instead, it treated “the whole country as a chess game.”47 This “COVID-
19 chess” requires pandemic management to be locally differentiated, but 
still coordinated by the center. Wuhan’s COVID-19 response, therefore, 
has to adapt to the city’s “actual circumstances”—but at the same time 
“firmly obey the command of the center,” especially the CCP Central 
Committee.48 Wuhan’s local officials thus walk a tightrope. They may 
deviate from national COVID-19 stipulations—but never too far, because 
“disobeying” the center’s “uniform leadership, command, and 
coordination in emergency response” can be punished by administrative 
repercussions and other sanctions.49 
This central–local “chess game” corresponds to Sino-Marxism, the 
official leading thought of the P.R.C. and CCP, and to its most recent 
variety, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for 
a New Era.”50 Sino-Marxists like Xi promote recentralization by “top-
down governance” and “top-level design” from the party and state center.51 
But they have also allowed legislative decentralization, particularly in the 
“reform and opening-up era” since 1978.52 Under Xi Jinping—contrary to 
widespread predictions 53 —this development cumulated in the largest 
decentralization in Chinese history through the Legislation Law revision in 
2015 and the constitutional reform in 2018.54  
 
 
47  Id. (“Quanguo Yi Pan Qi” (“全国一盘棋”)); Yiqing Fangkong Yao Jianchi Quanguo Yi Pan Qi 
(疫情防控要坚持全国一盘棋) [Pandemic Prevention and Control Must Uphold [Treating] the Whole 
Country as a Chess Match], ZHONGGUO GUANJIANCI (中国关键词) [CHINA KEYWORDS] (Mar. 13. 2020), 
http://keywords.china.org.cn/2020-03/13/content_75810523.htm. 
48  Xi, supra note 46. 
49  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tufa Shijian Yingduifa (中华人民共和国突发事件应对法) 
[P.R.C. Emergency Response Law] (Aug. 30, 2007), CLI.1.96791, art. 63, § 5 [hereinafter Emergencies 
Law]. 
50  CCP Statute gen. progr., § 8, art. 3, § 1, etc.; XIANFA pmbl., § 7:4; see Philipp Renninger, 
Chinese (Anti-)Constitutionalism: Sino-Marxism, Xi Jinping Thought, and Hong Kong, 
VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Nov. 28, 2019), https://verfassungsblog.de/chinese-anti-constitutionalism/. 
51  XI, supra note 23, at 76; see Matthias Stepan et al., What Does Xi Jinping’s Top-Down 
Leadership Mean for Innovation in China?, CHINAFILE (Oct. 27, 2016), 
https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-does-xi-jinpings-top-down-leadership-mean-innovation-
china; Qianfan Zhang, Legalising Central-local Relations in China, in CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS IN ASIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS 17, 32 (Andrew Harding & Mark Sidel eds., 2015); Grünberg & Drinhausen, 
supra note 22, at 3, 5. 
52  See ZHANG, supra note 19, at 79; Linda Chelan Li, Central-Local Relations in the People’s 
Republic of China: Trends, Processes and Impacts for Policy Implementation, 30 PUBL. ADMIN. DEV. 
177, 178 (2010), https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.573; CHUNG, supra note 13, at 16; YANG FENG, 
LEGISLATIVE DECENTRALIZATION IN CHINA IN THE REFORM ERA 17 (2019), 
https://repub.eur.nl/pub/94595.  
53  E.g., CHUNG, supra note 13, at 51, 67. 
54  Philipp Renninger, Local Legislation Despite the (Supposed) Risks of Decentralization: Theory 
of Central-Local Relations in the PRC, in RECHT UND RISIKO [LAW AND RISK] 105, 108 (Dario Haux et 
al. eds., 2019); ZHANG, supra note 19, at 150; FENG, supra note 52, at 89. 
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C. Law, Nonlaw, and Politics 
Following these reforms, if Chinese cities now want to act in a 
general and abstract manner, they can choose between the form of legal or 
nonlegal norms, and between the channels of the state or party. 
Since 2015, almost all territorial entities on the prefectural level have 
been granted the authority to enact formal law.55 There are now 288 out of 
289 prefectural-level cities with districts and four out of five cities without 
districts that are allowed to legislate.56 Yet, Wuhan as a provincial capital 
is one of 49 larger cities that were empowered to enact law as early as 
1982. 57  For Wuhan, the 2015 and 2018 reforms limited rather than 
increased legislative powers.58 Like any other prefectural city, Wuhan’s 
legislation is now limited to three areas: environmental protection, cultural 
heritage, and urban management.59 Despite the Legislation Law’s clear 
wording, this list is considered limited,60 although, most authors interpret 
each legislative area’s breadth expansively. 61  For example, urban 
management comprises of crisis management and sanitation 
management.62 Wuhan and other cities can employ two types of formal 
legal instruments: (1) quasi-legislative local regulations enacted by the 
 
 
55  Yan Ran (闫然) & Mao Yu (毛雨), Shequ de Shi Difang Lifa San Zhou Nian Dashuju Fenxi 
Baogao (设区的市地方立法三周年大数据分析报告) [Big Data Analysis on the Third Anniversary of 
the Legislation of Cities with Districts], 2018 DIFANG LIFA YANJIU (地方立法研究) [LOCAL LEGIS. J.], 
no. 3, at 26, 28. 
56  Wu Zeng (武增), 2015 Nian <Lifafa> Xiugai Beijing he Zhuyao Neirong Jiedu (2015 年《立
法法》修改背景和主要内容解读) [Background of the 2015 Legislation Law Revision and Explanation 
of its Main Content], 2015 ZHONGGUO FALV PINGLUN (中国法律评论) [CHINA L. REV.], no. 1, at 210, 212. 
57  Organization Law (1982 and 1986 Amend.) art. 27, § 2, art. 35, § 1. 
58  Wu, supra note 56, at 211; FENG, supra note 52, at 94.  
59  Legislation Law art. 72, § 2:1, art. 73, § 2, art. 82, § 3. However, local entities can be 
exceptionally empowered to enact local regulations as “delegated legislation,” art. 72, § 2:1. Moreover, 
local regulations and rules enacted by larger cities before the 2015 reform continue to be effective. 
Legislation Law art. 72, § 6, art. 82, § 3:2. 
60  See Li Shishi (李适时), former NPC Standing Committee Legislative Affairs Commission’s 
Chairman, Quanmian Guanche Shishi Xiugaihou de Lifafa—Zai Di Ershiyi Ci Quanguo Difang Lifa 
Yantaohui shang de Xiaojie (Zhaiyao) (全面贯彻实施修改后的立法法—在第二十一次全国地方立
法研讨会上的小结(摘要)) [Comprehensively Implement the Revised Legislation Law: Summary at the 
21st National Conference on Local Legislation (Excerpt)], FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报) [LEGAL DAILY] 
(Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c221/201509/ddd94851ccde4ea49be0c386f37d496b.shtm
l. 
61  See Zheng Yi (郑毅), Dui Woguo <Lifafa> Xiugaihou Ruogan Yinan Wenti de Quanshi yu 
Huiying (对我国《立法法》修改后若干疑难问题的诠释与回应) [Interpretation and Response to 
Some Difficult Questions after the Amendment of China’s Legislation Law], 2016 ZHENGZHI YU FALV 
(政治与法律) [POLIT. SCI. L.], no. 1, at 48, 53. 
62  See generally CHINA’S CRISIS MANAGEMENT (Jae Ho Chung ed., 2012) (regarding crisis 
management); ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO LIFAFA SHIYI (中华人民共和国立法法释义 ) 
[EXPLANATION OF THE P.R.C. LEGISLATION LAW] 244 (Quanguo Renda Changweihui Fazhi Gongzuo 
Weiyuanhui Guojiafashi (全国人大常委会法制工作委员会国家法室) [NPC Standing Comm. Legis. 
Aff. Comm., State L. Off.] ed., 2015). 
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Municipal People’s Congress and its MPC Standing Committee and (2) 
quasi-executive local governmental rules employed by the Municipal 
People’s Government.63 The quasi-legislative organs and their regulations 
are superior to the quasi-executive organs and their rules.64 
Before 1982, Wuhan could only employ nonlegal documents, that is, 
so-called “(other) normative documents.” 65  Even today, normative 
documents account for more than 90% of urban rules because for local-
state officials like Wuhan’s Municipal Government, they are easier to 
pass.66 First, these normative documents do not need to fulfill the same 
formal and procedural requirements as legal instruments.67 They even need 
not be published,68  although many of them are available on (non-)law 
databases.69 Second, normative documents can contain virtually the same 
content as formal law.70 Third, they even yield similar effects to formal 
legal local regulations and local rules.71 According to China’s Supreme 
People’s Court (“SPC”), normative documents have binding (i.e., not 
merely persuasive) and normative (i.e., not merely factual) force. 72 
Therefore, normative documents of the state can be defined as follows: all 
regulatory instruments employed by state organs that are general (i.e., 
person or entity-specific) and abstract (i.e., apply to many cases and thus 
are “repeatable”) but are not enumerated as law in the Legislation Law.73  
Besides local state norms, cities like Wuhan can enact local party 
norms as either intra-party laws or intra-party normative documents.74 
 
 
63  See XIANFA arts. 82, 100; Legislation Law arts. 72, 82; Organization Law arts. 7, 43, 60. 
64  XIANFA art. 101, § 1 (referring to institutions); Legislation Law art. 89, § 1 (referring to norms). 
65  Yuanshi Bu, Normenkollisionen und Normenkontrolle in China [Norm Collisions and Norm 
Control in China], 61 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 781, 784 (2015).  
66  Cui & Wan, supra note 28, at 8 (big data analysis). 
67  INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW, supra note 18, at 38; FENG, supra note 52, at 7–8. 
68  Cui & Wan, supra note 28, at apps. 1, 3. 
69  E.g., Laws and Regulations, Beida Fabao (北大法宝) [PKU Law], http://www.pkulaw.cn/. 
70  Bu, supra note 65, at 784; FENG, supra note 52, at 7. 
71  FENG, supra note 52, at 7. 
72  Guanyu Shiyong <Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa> de Jieshi (关于适用
《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的解释 ) [Interpretation on the Application of the “P.R.C. 
Administrative Litigation Law”] (Feb. 6, 2018), CLI.3.309904, art. 2, § 2 [hereinafter Litigation 
Interpretation]. Contra, INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW, supra note 18, at 38 (grants them merely 
“persuasive power”). 
73  See Yuan Yong (袁勇 ), Xingzheng Guifanxing Wenjian de Jianbie Biaozhun—Yi Bei’an 
Shencha Wei Zhongxin (行政规范性文件的鉴别标准—以备案审查为中心) [Standards for Identifying 
Administrative Normative Documents: Focus on Filing and Reviewing], 2010 ZHENGZHI YU FALV, no. 8, 
at 59, 60. 
74  See HARRO VON SENGER, PARTEI, IDEOLOGIE UND GESETZ IN DER VOLKSREPUBLIK CHINA 
[PARTY, IDEOLOGY, AND LAW IN THE P.R.C.] (1982). 
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These party norms are enacted through the local CCP committees instead 
of local state organs.75 
According to the “non-contradiction” principle, Wuhan’s local state 
norms—i.e., regulations, local governmental rules, 76  and normative 
documents—77must not contravene higher-ranking state law.78 They must 
also align with party norms—be these party norms enacted by the party 
center or by Wuhan’s own CCP committee.79 Consequently, central and 
local party norms impact not only CCP members (90 million persons in the 
entire country) but also China’s civil servants and ordinary citizens. 
II. PREPARATION: PANDEMIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
The intermingling of party and state, with the former’s superiority 
over the latter, is the essence of “socialism with Chinese Characteristics for 
a new era.” 80  Therefore, pandemic containment must also reflect a 
“socialist emergency management system with Chinese Characteristics for 
a new era.”81 Public health emergencies (PHEs) in China are managed by 
the party and the state, on both the central and local levels.82 The pandemic 
management system follows two overall principles: prevention and 
control.83 That system is implemented with four means: (non-)law, plans, 
 
 
75  See CCP Statute at. 46, § 1–2. 
76  Legislation Law art. 4, art. 72, § 2:1, art. 73, § 2:2, art. 87; MADELEINE MARTINEK, 
EXPERIMENTAL LEGISLATION IN CHINA BETWEEN EFFICIENCY AND LEGALITY 44 (2018). 
77  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa (中华人民共和国行政诉讼法) [P.R.C. 
Administrative Litigation Law] (Apr. 4, 1989, last amended June 27, 2017), CLI.1.297380, art. 53 
[hereinafter Litigation Law]; see Litigation Interpretation art. 148, § 2. 
78  See ZHANG, supra note 19, at 160. 
79  See Legislation Law art. 3; ZHANG, supra note 19, at 73, 163. 
80  CCP Statute gen. progr., § 8, art. 3, § 1; XIANFA pmbl., § 7:4. 
81  Quanmian Tuijin Xinshidai Zhongguo Tese Yingji Guanli Tixi Jianshe (全面推进新时代中国
特色应急管理体系建设) [Comprehensively Promote the Construction of an Emergency Management 
System With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era], 2019 ZHONGGUO YINGJI GUANLI (中国应急管理) 
[CHINESE EMERG. MANAG.], no. 11, at 12. 
82  Emergencies Law art. 4. 
83  Id. art. 1; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chuanranbing Fangzhifa (中华人民共和国传染病防
治法) [P.R.C. Law of the Prevention and Treatment of Infectious Diseases] (Feb. 21, 1989, last amended 
June 29, 2013), CLI.1.206064, art. 1 [hereinafter Diseases Law]; see Hongyi Lai, Managing 
Pandemic/Epidemic Crises: Institutional Setup and Overhaul, in CHINA’S CRISIS MANAGEMENT, supra 
note 62, 87. 
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institutions, and mechanisms,84 during the disaster cycle’s two main phases: 
preparation and response.85  
A. Central Stipulations on Pandemics in General 
In the disaster cycle’s first phase—preparation for possible 
pandemics—the central level enacted various (non-)laws and plans, and 
created organs to prevent and control future pandemics. 86  These 
instruments and institutions guarantee pandemic management on the 
central level and guide pandemic management on the local levels. 
1. Legislation and Planning. — First, the quasi-legislative National 
People’s Congress (NPC), through its Standing Committee, enacted 
several laws relevant to pandemics. The Emergencies Law regulates 
emergencies, including PHEs; 87  the Diseases Law regulates viral 
outbreaks; 88  and the Frontier Health and Quarantine Law regulates 
pandemic measures affecting people’s movement within China and 
returning to it from abroad. 89  The quasi-executive State Council’s 
concretized these laws through its PHE Regulation.90  
These national stipulations require both central and local entities to 
draw up “preparatory plans for the response to (public) emergencies.”91 
The central level enacted the Overall Emergency Response Plan92  and 
several specialized plans—for example, in pandemic outbreak scenarios, 
 
 
84  Gao Xiaoping (高小平), Jianshe Zhongguo Tese de Yingji Guanli Tixi (建设中国特色的应急
管理体系 ) [Construct an Emergency Management System with Chinese Characteristics], 2009 
ZHONGGUO YINGJI GUANLI, no. 4, at 11, 13 (2009); Wang Zhe et al., The Disaster and Emergency 
Management System in China, at 3 (CCOUC Policy Brief, May 2016), 
https://www.preventionweb.net/publications/view/57243.  
85  Shan Chunchang (闪淳昌) et al., Dui Woguo Yingji Guanli Jizhi Jianshe de Zongti Sikao (对我
国应急管理机制建设的总体思考) [Overall Thoughts on the Construction of China’s Emergency 
Management Mechanism], 2011 GUOJIA XINGZHENG XUEYUAN XUEBAO (国家行政学院学报) [J. CHIN. 
ACAD. GOVERN.], no. 1, at 8, 9 (2011); Mei Sun et al., The Public Health Emergency Management 
System in China: Trends from 
2002 to 2012, 18 BMC PUBLIC HEALTH, article no. 474, 3 (2018), https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentr
al.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-018-5284-1; Wang et al., supra note 88, at 5. 
86  Wang et al., supra note 84, at 3–5. 
87  Emergencies Law art. 1, art. 3, § 1. 
88  See Diseases Law art. 1, art. 3. 
89  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojing Weisheng Jianyifa (中华人民共和国国境卫生检疫法) 
(Dec. 2, 1986; last amended Apr. 27, 2018), CLI.1.313969 [hereinafter Frontier Law]. 
90  Tufa Gonggong Weisheng Shijian Yingji Tiaoli (突发公共卫生事件应急条例) [Public Health 
Emergency Response Regulation] (May 9, 2003, rev’d Jan. 8, 2011), CLI.2.174915 [hereinafter PHE 
Regulation]. 
91  Emergencies Law art. 17, §§ 2, 3; PHE Regulation art. 10, § 1, art. 11–12; see IHR app. 2, 
art. III, China, § 3:2; see Diseases Law art. 20. 
92  Guojia Tufa Gonggong Shijian Zongti Yingji Yu’an (国家突发公共事件总体应急预案) 
[National Overall Preparatory Plan for Public Emergency Response] (Jan. 8, 2006), CLI.2.72930, 
http://www.gov.cn/yjgl/2005-08/07/content_21048.htm [hereinafter Nat’l Emergency Plan]. 
DECEMBER 2020 THE PEOPLE’S TOTAL WAR ON COVID-19 75 
the National PHE Response Plan.93 Such health-related contingency plans 
are required by the International Health Regulations (IHR), international 
law enacted by the WHO’s World Health Assembly.94 The IHR are binding 
for WHO member states and the P.R.C. has committed itself to apply them 
within its entire territory.95 
2. Institutions. — On the national level, the quasi-executive State 
Council is in charge of applying these IHR and managing PHEs.96 Through 
the State Council’s 2018 institutional reform,97 thirteen of its departments 
have been merged into one: the Ministry of Emergency Management.98 
Although considered a “turning point in China’s disaster preparedness,” 
this “super ministry” has no specific authority for pandemic and PHE 
management.99 Instead, this task is vested in the State Council’s health 
administration,100 reassembled in 2018 as the National Health Commission 
(NHC).101 For infectious diseases like COVID-19, the NHC relies on the 
expertise of its specialized agency, the Chinese Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CCDC).102 The NHC houses the office of the National 
Patriotic Sanitary Campaign Committee (NPSCC), a standing advisory and 
coordinating institution between 32 State Council departments.103  
The CCP, in contrast, has not created separate party organs 
responsible for public health. Rather, it has created party groups inside the 
NHC and CCDC.104  
 
 
93  Guojia Tufa Gonggong Weisheng Shijian Yingji Yu’an (国家突发公共卫生事件应急预案) 
[National Preparatory Plan for Public Health Emergency Response] (Feb. 26, 2006), CLI.2.75052, 
http://www.gov.cn/yjgl/2006-02/26/content_211654.htm [hereinafter Nat’l PHE Plan]. 
94  IHR annex 1, art. A, § 6(g), art. B, § 2(a); see WHO, Guidance for Contingency Planning, at 5, 
WHO/WHE/CPI/2018.13 (2018), https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/260554. 
95  See IHR app. 2, art. III, China, § 1. 
96  Emergencies Law art. 9; see Diseases Law art. 6; PHE Regulation art. 3. 
97  Guowuyuan Jigou Gaige Fang’an (国务院机构改革方案) [State Council Institutional Reform 
Plan] (Mar. 17, 2017), decided through CLI.1.311597, art. 1, § 7:1. 
98  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yingji Guanlibu (中华人民共和国应急管理部), established 
Apr. 16, 2018. 
99  Cao Yue, A Turning Point in China’s Disaster Preparedness?, ZHONGWAI DUIHUA (中外对话) 
[CHINADIALOGUE] (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/10768-A-
turning-point-in-China-s-disaster-preparedness.  
100  See Diseases Law art. 6; see IHR app. 2, art. III, China, § 2:1. 
101  State Council Institutional Reform Plan art. 7, § 5:1; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia 
Weisheng Jiankang Weiyuanhui (中华人民共和国国家卫生健康委员会), established Mar. 27, 2018. 
102  Zhongguo Jibing Yufang Kongzhi Zhongxin (中国疾病预防控制中心), established Dec. 23, 
1983. 
103  Quanguo Aiguo Weisheng Yundong Weiyuanhui ( 全国爱国卫生运动委员会 ), first 
established 1952; see Xuan Zhao et al., Governance Function Analysis of the Patriotic Health Movement 
in China, 4 GLOB. HEALTH RES. POLICY, article no. 34, 2 (2019). 
104  Guojia Weisheng Jiankang Weiyuanhui Dangzu (国家卫生健康委员会党组); Guojia Jibing 
Yufang Kongzhi Zhongxin Dangwei (中国疾病预防控制中心党委). 
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B. Wuhan’s Pandemic Preparation through Prevention 
The local levels must also prepare for possible pandemics. 
Beginning in the preparation phase, the prevention principle requires local 
entities to both establish institutions and create plans for preventing and 
controlling future pandemics.105 
1. Institutions: Health Administration and Headquarters. — Parallel 
to the central level, the authority for PHE preparation and management on 
the local levels is granted to the quasi-executive, like the people’s 
governments of Wuhan and its districts like Wuchang. Again, this task is 
not vested in the recently created Emergency Management Departments of 
Wuhan or its districts, 106  but in the recently redesigned local health 
administration.107 This health administration consists of Wuhan’s Health 
Commission (WHC) and its specialized agency, Wuhan’s Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention (WCDC),108 as well as the District Health 
Departments. 109  Moreover, both Wuhan and its districts established 
Patriotic Sanitary Campaign Committees as standing institutions that 
advise and coordinate health-related work.110 All local state departments 
are equipped with party groups, which are presided over by their 
department heads. For example, WHC director Zhang Hongxing also 
serves as the Secretary of the WHC’s party group,111  as does WCDC 
director Li Gang for the WCDC’s party group.112  
Besides the health administration, there are also quasi-executive 
“headquarters for emergency response.”113 According to national law, only 
 
 
105  Wang et al., supra note 84, at 3–5. 
106  For a complete list of Wuhan’s existing reform plans, see Wuhanshi Jigou Gaige Fang’an (武
汉市机构改革方案) [Wuhan Institutional Reform Plan] (Jan. 10, 2019), Wuhan Institutional Reform 
Plan Announced, URBAN MANAGEMENT AND LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMITTEE 
http://cgw.wuhan.gov.cn/JDHY_13520/cgw_cgxw/202004/t20200416_1010073.html; Wuhanshi 
Yingji Guanliju (武汉市应急管理局), established Jan. 29, 2019; e.g., Wuchangqu Yingji Guanliju (武
昌区应急管理局), established Mar. 27, 2019.  
107  See Diseases Law art. 5; art. 6; PHE Regulation art. 4, § 2; see IHR app. 2, art. III, China, § 2:2. 
108  See Diseases Law art. 7; Wuhanshi Weisheng Jiankang Weiyuanhui (武汉市卫生健康委员会), 
established Jan. 25, 2019; Wuhanshi Jibing Yufang Kongzhi Zhongxin (武汉市疾病预防控制中心), 
established Dec. 3, 2002. 
109  E.g., Wuchangqu Weisheng Jiankangju (武昌区卫生健康局), established Mar. 27, 2019. 
110  E.g., Wuhanshi Aiguo Weisheng Yundong Weiyuanhui (武汉市爱国卫生运动委员会 ); 
Wuchangqu Aiguo Weisheng Yundong Weiyuanhui (武昌区爱国卫生运动委员会); Wuhanshi Aiguo 
Weisheng Cujin Tiaoli (武汉市爱国卫生促进条例) [Wuhan Patriotic Sanitation Promotion Regulation] 
art. 5 (May 24, 2017), https://law.cnki.net/fyfgzt/flfg/地方法规/湖北/武汉市爱国卫生促进条例.pdf. 
111  Zhonggong Wuhanshi Weisheng Jiankang Weiyuanhui Weiyuanhui (中共武汉市卫生健康委
员会委员会), established Jan. 9, 2019; see http://www.whzg.gov.cn/gbrm/45741.jhtml.  
112  Wuhanshi Jibing Yufang Kongzhi Zhongxin Dangwei (武汉市疾病预防控制中心党委); see 
https://www.whcdc.org/show/4.html.  
113  See PHE Regulation art. 3, art. 4, § 1. 
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the central and provincial levels establish such headquarters. 114 
Nevertheless, prefectural-level Wuhan created one overall headquarter—
Wuhan’s Emergency Response Commission—115as well as specialized 
headquarters for almost every emergency imaginable. 116  There are 
municipal headquarters for inundations, earthquakes, and terrorist attacks 
but also for “tourism emergencies,” “low-temperature rain,” and “snow 
freezing disasters.” 117  Until lately, several headquarters existed for 
different health-related emergencies—for the case of pandemics and 
infectious diseases, the Wuhan’s Headquarters for PHE Response. 118 
However, in a consolidation attempt, Wuhan’s Emergency Response 
Commission merged Wuhan’s Headquarters for PHE Response and other 
health-related headquarters into the Wuhan’s Comprehensive Health 
Emergency Response Commission (Headquarters). 119  According to 
national law, all these headquarters must consist of government members 
only.120 However, Wuhan also staffed them with “leading comrades,” that 
is, local party cadres.121 
2. Planning: Emergency Plans. — Besides institutions, the local 
quasi-executive must establish preparatory plans—first, a comprehensive 
“preparatory plan for public emergency response.”122 Both Wuhan and its 
districts enacted overall preparatory plans and drafted templates for lower-
level entities like streets and residential communities. 123  Additionally, 
 
 
114  PHE Regulation art. 3, art. 4, § 1. 
115  Wuhanshi Tufa Shijian Yingji Weiyuanhui (武汉市突发事件应急委员会), established 2013. 
116  See Wuhanshi Tufa Shijian Zongti Yingji Yu’an (武汉市突发事件总体应急预案) [Wuhan 
Overall Preparatory Plan for Emergency Response] (Mar. 19, 2013), CLI.14.723002, 
http://www.wuhan.gov.cn/zwgk/xxgk/zfwj/szfwj/202003/t20200316_973732.shtml, art. 2, § 1–2 
[hereinafter Wuhan Emergency Plan]. 
117  Wuhan Emergency Plan art. 2, § 2. 
118  Wuhanshi Tufa Gonggong Weisheng Shijian Yingji Zhihuibu (武汉市突发公共卫生事件应
急指挥部), established Nov. 24, 2014. See Wuhanshi Tufa Gonggong Weisheng Shijian Yingji Yu’an 
(武汉市突发公共卫生事件应急预案 ) [Wuhan Preparatory Plan for Public Health Emergency 
Response] (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.wuhan.gov.cn/zwgk/xxgk/zfwj/bgtwj/202003/t20200316_9744
42.shtml, art. 2, § 1 [hereinafter Wuhan PHE Plan]. 
119  See Guanyu Tiaozheng Shi Tufa Shijian Yingji Weiyuanhui he Zhuanxiang Yingji Weiyuanhui 
(Zhihuibu) Zucheng Renyuan de Tongzhi (关于调整市突发事件应急委员会和专项应急委员会(指挥
部)组成人员的通知) [Notice on Adjusting Members of the Municipal Emergency Response Committee 
and Special Emergency Response Committees (Headquarters)], art. 2, § 4:1 (Sept. 30, 2019), 
http://zt.cjn.cn/zt2019/whyj/yjjy/201912/t3518203.htm; Wuhanshi Zonghe Weisheng Shijian Zhuanti 
Yingji Weiyuanhui (Zhihuibu) (武汉市综合卫生事件专项应急委员会(指挥部)), established Oct. 12, 
2019. 
120  PHE Regulation art. 4, § 1. 
121  Wuhan Emergency Plan art. 2, § 2.2; Wuhan PHE Plan art. 2, § 1.1. 
122  Emergencies Law art. 17, § 3. 
123  Wuhan Emergency Plan, supra note 125; e.g., Wuchangqu Tufa Gonggong Shijian Zongti 
Yingji Yu’an (武昌区突发公共事件总体应急预案) [Wuchang District Overall Preparatory Plan for 
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governments at and above the county level, including municipal and 
district governments, must formulate special plans—in the case of 
pandemics, “preparatory plans for infectious disease prevention and 
control.”124 “Preparatory plans for PHE response,” in contrast, shall only 
be enacted by the central and provincial levels. 125  Nevertheless, 
prefectural-level Wuhan and its county-level districts have drawn up the 
latter PHE plans instead of the former disease plans.126  
The obligation to formulate health-related preparatory plans has 
been extended in the wake of the coronavirus crisis.127 Even grassroots-
level entities must now elaborate pandemic-related plans: one “overall plan 
for pandemic prevention and control work” and one “plan for emergency 
pandemic response work.”128 
C. Central–Local Pandemic Preparation through Control: Mechanisms 
These preventive instruments and institutions must be effectively 
controlled from the very beginning. Starting in the preparation phase, the 
control principle demands that central and local entities monitor their 
pandemic-related plans and organs through various mechanisms. 
Particularly important is the Early Warning System for Infectious 
Diseases (EWS),129  which the P.R.C. has already devoted 730 million 
RMB (115 million USD) toward. 130  Local governments must report 
infections and (potential) outbreaks immediately to “the health 
administration at higher levels and to the health administration under the 
State Council,” which then warn all lower-level entities.131 All medical 
 
 
Public Emergency Response] (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.wuchang.gov.cn/zwgk_37/zc/qtzdgkwj/qzf
wj/202005/t20200501_1213938.html; Wuchangqu ***Jiedao Banshichu Tufa Gonggong Shijian Yingji 
Yu’an (武昌区***街道办事处突发公共事件应急预案) [Wuchang District XY Street Preparatory Plan 
for Public Emergency Response] (May 19, 2008), 
http://www.360doc.com/content/19/1104/08/21644671_870969293.shtml; Wuchangqu ***Jiedao 
Banshichu ***Shequ Tufa Gonggong Shijian Yingji Yu’an (武昌区***街道办事处***社区突发公共
事件应急预案) [Wuchang District XY Street XY Residential Community Preparatory Plan for Public 
Emergency Response] (May 19, 2008), index no. 000042021/2010-02221. 
124  Diseases Law art. 20. 
125  PHE Regulation art. 10, § 2. 
126  Wuhan PHE Plan; e.g., Wuchangqu Xuexiao Tufa Gonggong Weisheng Shijian Yingji Yu’an 
(武昌区学校突发公共卫生事件应急预案) [Wuchang District Preparatory Plan for Schools’ Public 
Health Emergency Response] (May 21, 2008), copy at http://www.chinazhaokao.com/wendang/cehua/
957839.html. 
127  Gelei Fangkong Jishu Zhinan (各类防控技术指南) [Technical Guidelines on Prevention and 
Control of All Types] (Apr. 8, 2020), CLI.4.343288, art. 21, § 2:1 http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-
04/09/content_5500689.htm, [hereinafter Technical Guidelines]. 
128  Id. art. 21, § 2:1. 
129  Diseases Law art. 19, § 1; Emergencies Law art. 42, § 1. 
130  Guo Rui, Coronavirus: Why did China’s Multimillion-Dollar Early Warning System Fail?, S. 
CHINA MORN. POST (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3075027/coron
avirus-why-did-chinas-multimillion-dollar-early-warning.  
131  See Diseases Law arts. 33, § 1, 20, § 3. 
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institutions too, and even “every entity and individual” who “notice an 
infectious disease patient or suspect” are obligated to report. 132  This 
warning mechanism is designed to prevent deficient reporting by local and 
other entities.133 Deficient reporting was a grave problem in former PHEs 
like the 2002–03 SARS epidemic.134 
In addition to the EWS, criminal, civil, and administrative punitive 
mechanisms guarantee pandemic preparedness. 135  These mechanisms 
punish any official, citizen, or entity found out of compliance with the 
EWS or any other aspect of pandemic prevention or control. Citizens and 
private entities are held criminally, civilly, or administratively liable if they 
offend provisions of the Emergencies Law or the Diseases Law.136 On top 
of personal liability, officials found liable are subject to disciplinary 
measures like demotion, removal, and dismissal if they fail to contain 
emergencies in general or pandemics in particular.137 
III. RESPONSE: COVID-19 MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
Punitive mechanisms also extend to failures in the disaster cycle’s 
second phase: response to pandemics like COVID-19. Initially, the 
prevention principle requires all central and local entities to “detect, report, 
isolate, diagnose, and treat” infectious diseases as early as possible, in 
order to stop a disease from developing into a pandemic.138 However, if a 
significant outbreak occurs, the control principle then demands central and 
local entities to “cut off transmission routes,” in order to ultimately “stop 
the disease.”139 
A. Central Stipulations on COVID-19 in Particular 
During the current COVID-19 pandemic outbreak, both the party 
and state center established special standards and institutions guiding the 
P.R.C.’s pandemic response. 
1. State (Non-)Legislation and Institutions. — The state center 
contributes to COVID-19 management primarily through the quasi-
 
 
132  See Diseases Law arts. 30–31. 
133  LAN XUE & GUANG ZENG, A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION ON EMERGENCY RESPONSE IN 
CHINA: THE CASE OF PANDEMIC INFLUENZA (H1N1) 2009 77 (2019). 
134  Guo Rui, supra note 130. 
135  Ruiping Ye, Kill the Chickens to Scare the Monkeys, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (May 13, 2020), 
https://verfassungsblog.de/kill-the-chickens-to-scare-the-monkeys/.  
136  Emergencies Law art. 65–68; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (中华人民共和国刑法) 
[P.R.C. Criminal Law] (July 1, 1979, last amended Nov. 4, 2017), CLI.1.256346, art. 330–332 
[hereinafter Criminal Law]; see Diseases Law art. 73–77; PHE Regulation art. 51–52. 
137  See Emergencies Law art. 63–64 (generally); Diseases Law art. 65–72 (particularly); see also 
PHE Regulation art. 45–50 (particularly). 
138  PHE Regulation art. 42; Emergencies Law art. 1. 
139  PHE Regulation art. 42; Emergencies Law art. 1. 
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executive State Council. Its newly established Ministry of Emergency 
Management lacks authority for public health issues and thus plays a minor 
role in coronavirus crisis response.140 As of December 2020, the Ministry 
had issued only one relevant notice demanding precautionary measures 
against COVID-19 in workplaces. 141  Rather, the central-level health 
administration took the first national steps in fighting the coronavirus.142 
On January 20,143 the NHC qualified COVID-19 as a Class B infectious 
disease,144 but implemented the highest Class A prevention and control 
measures.145 Subsequently, the NHC enacted several normative documents 
like the continuously updated national COVID-19 Preparation and Control 
Plan, currently in its seventh version.146 The NHC’s specialized agency, 
the CCDC, issued urgent medical recommendations, for example on 
quarantine issues.147  
Yet, the chief state institution for COVID-19 containment is a 
coordination of 32 State Council departments: the State Council Joint 
Mechanism for COVID-19 Prevention and Control Work.148 This ad hoc 
institution was created in response to COVID-19, differing from the 
NPSCC as the standing institution for the coordination of health-related 
State Council work. The Joint Mechanism enacted several guidelines, for 
 
 
140  Jianjue Daying Yiqing Fangkong Zujizhan he Fangfan Huajie Zhongda Fengxian 
Gongjianzhan (坚决打赢疫情防控阻击战和防范化解重大风险攻坚战) [Resolutely Win the Blockade 
War of Pandemic Prevention and Control and the Assault War of Major Risk Precaution and Solution], 
2020 ZHONGGUO YINGJI GUANLI, no. 2, 4. 
141  Guanyu Zuohao Dangqian Anquan Fangfan Gongzuo de Tongzhi (关于做好当前安全防范工
作的通知 ) [Notice on Doing the Current Safety and Precaution Work Well] (Jan. 28, 2020), 
CLI.4.340980, http://www.cww.net.cn/article?id=464668. 
142  See Diseases Law art. 3, § 4; PHE Regulation art. 30. 
143  Gonggao 2020 Nian Di Yi Hao (公告 2020 年第 1 号) [Announcement 1] (Jan. 20, 2020), 
CLI.4.338898, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2020-01/21/content_5471164.htm, art. 1. 
144  See Diseases Law art. 3, § 2. 
145  See Diseases Law art. 4, § 1. 
146  Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Feiyan Fangkong Fang’an (Di Qi Ban) (新型冠状病毒肺炎防控
方案(第七版) (Jan. 22, 2020, last rev’d Sept. 11, 2020), CLI.4.346884, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-
09/15/content_5543680.htm. 
147  See Xu Xinyi (许心怡), Weihe Dui Rujing Renyuan Jizhong Geli Guancha? Zhongguo Jikong 
Zhongxin Huiying (为何对入境人员集中隔离观察? 中国疾控中心回应) [Why Centrally Quarantine 
Persons Entering the Country? CCDC Responds], PEOPLE’S HEALTH NET, Apr. 2, 2020, 
http://health.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0402/c14739-31659464.html.  
148  See Bai Jianfeng (白剑峰), 32 Ge Bumen Jianli Lianfang Liankong Jizhi (32 个部门建立联防
联控机制) [32 Departments Establish Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism], RENMIN RIBAO, Jan. 
22, 2020, at 10, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2020-01/22/nw.D110000renmrb_20200122_2-
10.htm; Guowuyuan Yingdui Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan Yiqing Lianfang Liankong 
Gongzuo Jizhi (国务院应对新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎疫情联防联控工作机制), established Jan. 21, 
2020. 
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example, on the prevention and control techniques for different spaces, 
sectors, and persons,149 and on the resumption of work and production.150 
2. Party (Non-)Legislation and Institutions. — All these state organs 
cooperate with another ad hoc institution established by the CCP Central 
Committee: the Central Leading Group for COVID-19 Work. 151  This 
Leading Group issued important party normative documents, such as a 
guiding opinion on the resumption of work and production.152 The Leading 
Group is presided by Premier and second-ranking CCP member Li 
Keqiang, who became the center’s main face in the initial period of 
COVID-19 response.153 
Besides Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, Sun Chunlan (孙春兰), second 
Vice Premier and CCP Politburo member, plays a leading role in fighting 
COVID-19. Concerning the central level and the channels of the state, she 
presides over the standing NPSCC and chaired some Joint Mechanism 
meetings.154 And regarding the local levels and the channels of the party, 
 
 
149  Technical Guidelines, supra note 127. 
150  Quanguo Butong Fengxian Diqu Qiye Danwei Fugong Fuchan Yiqing Fangkong Cuoshi Zhinan 
(全国不同风险地区企事业单位复工复产疫情防控措施指南) [Guidelines on Prevention and Control 
Measures of Enterprises and Units in Territories of Different Risk in the Whole Country at the 
Resumption of Work and Production] (Apr. 7, 2020), CLI.2.341265, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/conte
nt/2020-04/09/content_5500685.htm [hereinafter Resumption Guidelines]. 
151  Zhongyang Yingdui Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran Feiyan Yiqing Gongzuo Lingdao 
Xiaozu (中央应对新型冠状病毒感染肺炎疫情工作领导小组), established Jan. 2020 [hereinafter CCP 
Leading Group]. 
152  Guanyu Zai Youxiao Fangkong Yiqing de Tongshi Jiji Youxu Tuijin Fugong Fuchan de Zhidao 
Yijian (关于在有效防控疫情的同时积极有序推进复工复产的指导意见) [Guiding Opinion on, 
Whilst Effectively Preventing and Controlling the Pandemic, Proactively and Orderly Promoting the 
Resumption of Work and Production] (Apr. 7, 2020), CLI.16.341266, 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2020-04/09/content_5500698.htm [hereinafter CCP Resumption 
Opinion]. This Opinion was coordinated with the Joint Mechanism’s Resumption Guidelines, supra 
note 150, on the same topic from the same day. 
153  Li Keqiang Zhuchi Zhaokai Zhongyang Yingdui Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran Feiyan 
Yiqing Gongzuo Lingdao Xiaozu (李克强主持召开中央应对新型冠状病毒感染肺炎疫情工作领导小
组会议) [Li Keqiang Chairs and Convenes Meeting of the CCP Leading Group], XINHUAWANG (Jan. 26, 
2020), http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-01/26/c_1125504004.htm; see Kerry Brown & Ruby 
Congjiang Wang, Politics and Science: The Case of China and the Coronavirus, 51 ASIAN AFF. 247, 
252 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2020.1752567. 
154  Zhuchi Zhaokai Guowuyuan Yingdui Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan Yiqing 
Lianfang Liankong Gongzuo Jizhi Huiyishi Qiangdiao: Qieshi Luoshi Zeren, Yange Fangkong Cuoshi, 
Jianjue Daying Yiqing Fangkong Gonjianzhan (孙春兰主持召开国务院应对新型冠状病毒感染的肺
炎疫情联防联控工作机制会议时强调 切实落实责任 严格防控措施 坚决打赢疫情防控攻坚战) 
[Sun Chunlan, When Chairing and Convening Meeting of the Joint Mechanism, Emphasizes: Earnestly 
Implement Responsibilities, Strictly [Take] Prevent and Control Measures, and Resolutely Win the 
Assault War of Prevention and Control], XINHUAWANG (Jan. 24, 2020), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-01/24/c_1125500230.htm. 
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Sun led the CCP Leading Group when dispatched to Wuhan, in order to 
“lead the local frontline prevention and control.”155 
B. Wuhan’s COVID-19 Response and the Missing Benefits of Pandemic 
Preparation 
Responsibility for this local frontline work in Wuhan fell on the 
prefectural-level city itself rather than its county-level districts because 
more than two districts were affected by the coronavirus.156 Unfortunately, 
Wuhan’s pandemic preparation failed, which affected its response to 
COVID-19. The errors in its pandemic preparation eroded the city’s ability 
to prevent COVID-19 from spreading, which ultimately led Wuhan to 
control COVID-19 with the strictest measures available.157 
1. Failed COVID-19 Prevention and Failed Preparation through 
Control. — Several pneumonia cases of an unknown origin appeared in 
Wuhan starting November 17, 2019, and possibly earlier.158 These cases 
were soon connected, and their common trigger identified as the novel 
coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 (and not the “old” 2002–03 coronavirus SARS-
CoV-1). The prefectural-level WHC was aware of these details on 
December 27, 2019, at the latest.159 It then passed on important information 
to the national-level NHC.160 However, both the local and central health 
administrations covered up the new virus’s existence, extent, and severity 
by silencing doctors and destroying samples. 161  Had Wuhan started 
containing COVID-19 one, two, or three weeks earlier in January 2020, the 
number of infections in the city could have been reduced by 66%, 86%, or 
95%, respectively.162 Nor would COVID-19 have evolved into a global 
 
 
155  Zhongyang Zhidaozu Zai Hubei Kaizhan Yiqing Fangkong Zhidao Gongzuo (中央指导组在湖
北开展疫情防控指导工作 ) [Central Leading Group Launches the Leading Work of Pandemic 
Prevention and Control in Hubei], XINHUAWANG (Jan. 28, 2020), http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2
020-01/28/c_1125508653.htm; WHO, supra note 7, at 14. 
156  Emergencies Law art. 7. 
157  See Xi, supra note 5 (giving praise but also indirect criticism). 
158  Josephine Ma, Coronavirus: China’s First Confirmed Covid-19 Case Traced Back to 
November 17, S. CHINA MORN. POST (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/artic
le/3074991/coronavirus-chinas-first-confirmed-covid-19-case-traced-back.  
159  Id. 
160  Id. 
161  Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, Timeline: The Early Days of China’s Coronavirus Outbreak and 
Cover-up, AXIOS (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.axios.com/timeline-the-early-days-of-chinas-
coronavirus-outbreak-and-cover-up-ee65211a-afb6-4641-97b8-353718a5faab.html; Gao Yu et al., How 
Early Signs of the Coronavirus were Spotted, Spread and Throttled in China, STRAITS TIMES (Feb. 28, 
2020), https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/how-early-signs-of-the-coronavirus-were-spotted-
spread-and-throttled-in-china.  
162  Shengjie Lai et al., Effect of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions to Contain COVID-19 in China, 
585 NATURE 410, 410–413 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-020-2293-x.  
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pandemic as rapidly if the P.R.C. had restricted its citizens’ international 
travel before late January.163 
These central and local flaws of COVID-19 response through 
prevention are related to the failure of general pandemic preparation 
through control. China’s most important control mechanism, the EWS, did 
not function well despite its previously optimistic evaluation by Chinese 
scholars,164 and its considerable maintenance costs.165 The simple reason 
was that central, local, and other institutions like hospitals refrained from 
feeding the EWS information necessary to activate the warning 
mechanism.166  
As a reaction, in late January, the center activated its punitive 
mechanisms by disciplining state officials and party cadres from six 
provinces for neglecting pandemic prevention and control duties.167 But 
fewer officials were punished for neglecting pandemic management at the 
beginning of COVID-19 than citizens were for “obstructing” pandemic 
management later on. 168  Moreover, only local-level officials were 
disciplined while central-level health administrators were spared, although 
they had also failed.169 In a familiar pattern,170 China’s central level takes 
the credit when all is well but refuses to take the blame when things go 
badly. 171  However, the center’s blaming of local levels for failure in 
COVID-19 containment contains more than a kernel of truth. Local entities 
like Wuhan and Hubei indeed acted with undue delay. For example, on 
January 19, in midst of the COVID-19 outbreak, Wuhan’s municipal 
administration permitted a huge potluck banquet.172 This “Myriad Families 
 
 
163  Steffen Richter, “Das Politbüro hat beschlossen, dass die Epidemie vorbei ist" [“The Politburo 
Has Decided That the Epidemic Is Over”], ZEIT (Mar. 28, 2020), 
https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2020-03/china-coronavirus-propaganda-epidemie-wirtschaft-usa.  
164  LAN & GUANG, supra note 133, at 228, 239; Sun et al., supra note 89, at 4. 
165  Guo Rui, supra note 130. 
166  Id. 
167  See Diseases Law art. 65; Sha Xueliang (沙雪良), Cong Futing Dao Cunguan, Liu Sheng Shi 
Duoming Ganbu Fangyi Shizhi Beiwenze (从副厅到村官，六省市多名干部防疫失职被问责) [From 
Vice Departments to Village Officials, Several Cadres From Six Provinces and Cities Are Held 
Accountable for Neglecting Duties of Pandemic Prevention], XINJINGBAO (新京报) [BEIJING NEWS] (Jan. 
29, 2020), http://www.bjnews.com.cn/news/2020/01/29/681201.html; Ryan Ho Kilpatrick, Report 
Raises Questions About Chinese Leader's Coronavirus Timeline, DPA INTERNATIONAL (Feb. 16, 2020), 
https://www.dpa-international.com/topic/report-raises-questions-chinese-leader-coronavirus-timeline-
urn%3Anewsml%3Adpa.com%3A20090101%3A200216-99-936654. 
168  Ye, supra note 135. 
169  Sha, supra note 167; Kilpatrick, supra note 167. 
170  See Zhenhua Su et al., Constructed Hierarchical Government Trust in China: Formation 
Mechanism and Political Effects, 89 PAC. AFF. 771, 783 (2016); CHUNG, supra note 13, at 70. 
171  Brown & Wang, supra note 170, at 252. 
172  Su Zimu (苏子牧), Wuhan Shequ Haizai Juban Wanjiayan, Shizhang Huiying (武汉社区还在
举办万家宴 市长回应) [Wuhan’s Residential Community Still Hosts the Myriad Families Banquet: 
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Banquet” was so large (40,000 families participating and 13,000 dishes 
shared) that it was intended to break a Guinness World Record.173 For 
pandemic containment failure of this scope, national law demands to 
demote, remove, dismiss, or even criminally punish the “key leaders of the 
local governments.”174 Despite these stipulations, as of December 2020, 
the center has not held Wuhan’s Mayor and Hubei’s Governor accountable 
for this failure.175 
2. Successful COVID-19 Control but Failed Preparation through 
Prevention. — Four days after the Myriad Families Banquet, Wuhan 
finally responded to COVID-19—through control measures, as the 
opportunity to prevent the outbreak had long since passed. Yet, the city’s 
COVID-19 response through control illuminated the ineffectiveness of 
Wuhan’s general pandemic preparation through prevention as well. The 
city activated neither its existing preparatory plans nor preparatory 
headquarters.176  
Nevertheless, Wuhan’s COVID-19 control appears successful. 
Bearing in mind unreported cases and restricted information,177 COVID-
19 numbers in the city and the entire country have remained stagnant for 
months.178 In Wuhan, 50,353 cases (whole Mainland China: 86,464) have 
been confirmed, including convalesced, suffering, and deceased 
patients.179 Death tolls in Wuhan (3,869 cases, whole Mainland China: 
4,634),180 however, have been corrected upwards by 50% in April,181 and 
 
 
Mayor Responds], DUOWEI XINWEN ( 多 维 新 闻 ) [DUOWEI NEWS] (Jan. 22, 2020), 
https://www.dwnews.com/中国 /60165812/武汉肺炎疫情武汉社区还在举办万家宴市长回应 ; 
Kilpatrick, supra note 167. 
173  Kilpatrick, supra note 167. 
174  PHE Regulation art. 45, § 1–3, arts. 46–47. 
175  Ye, supra note 135. 
176  Lv Yiming (吕一鸣), Xinguan Yiyan Yiqing “Hubei Baoweizhan” Hubei Dakaozhong Zhanshi 
Jingmai Qiezhen yu Kaifang Liaozhi (新冠疫炎疫情“湖北保卫战”湖北大考中战时经脉切诊与开
方疗治) [In the Final Exam of COVID-19 “Hubei Defense War” During Wartime, Make a Pulse 
Diagnosis and Prescription Treatment], CAOGEN ( 草 根 ) [GRASSROOTS] (Mar. 4, 2020), 
http://www.caogen.com/blog/Infor_detail/109893.html. 
177  See The Consequences of Corona in China: The End of the Crisis is the Beginning of the Next 
One, MERICS (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.merics.org/en/newsletter/china-update-62020; Richter, 
supra note 163.  
178  Second COVID-19 Wave in China ‘Inevitable’: Top Experts, supra note 9. 
179  WHC, supra note 8; NHC, supra note 8. 
180  WHC, supra note 8; NHC, supra note 8. 
181  Wuhan’s COVID-19 Headquarters, Guanyu Wuhanshi Xinguan Feiyan Quezhen Binglishu 
Quezhen Bingli Siwangshu Dingzheng Qingkuang de Tongbao (关于武汉市新冠肺炎确诊病例数确
诊病例死亡数订正情况的通报) [Notification of the Correction Situation of the Numbers of Confirmed 
COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in Wuhan] (Apr. 17, 2020), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-
04/17/content_5503568.htm. 
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are estimated ten times higher by alternative sources. 182  Nevertheless, 
China’s COVID-19 prevalence is far lower than in many other countries.183 
The WHO attributes this supposed success to “the most ambitious, agile, 
and aggressive disease containment effort in history.”184 In Wuhan, this 
effort is based on notices, 185  as well as other normative documents 
communicated to the public through social media like WeChat and 
Weibo.186 
C. Wuhan’s COVID-19 Control, Phase One: Lockdown Toward the 
Outside 
Most importantly, Wuhan’s COVID-19 related normative 
documents stipulated several cordons sanitaires, restricting movement in 
and out of specific territories.187 The first cordon Wuhan drew was large—
it surrounded the whole city (8,500 km²) and resulted in a lockdown for 
millions of people.  
1. Blockade Through Non-Legislation. — On January 23, 2020, 
Wuhan’s first notice forbade all persons within the city from leaving, 
except for special reasons.188 Train stations and airports closed and long-
distance transport was suspended.189 This lockdown is compatible with 
international WHO law.190 The IHR allow countries to “refuse entry of 
unaffected persons to affected areas” as well as “implement exit screening 
and/or restrictions on persons from affected areas.”191 Under national law, 
a “blockade of infectious disease areas” of large cities and main traffic lines 
like Wuhan must be decided by the national-level State Council. 192 
 
 
182  Estimates Show Wuhan Death Toll Far Higher Than Official Figure, RADIO FREE ASIA 
(Luisetta Mudie ed., trans., Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/wuhan-deaths-
03272020182846.html.  
183  See Second COVID-19 Wave in China ‘Inevitable’: Top Experts, supra note 9. 
184  WHO, supra note 7, at 16. 
185  These Wuhanshi Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan Yiqing Fangkong Zhihuibu 
Tonggao (武汉市新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎疫情防控指挥部通告) [Notices of Wuhan’s COVID-19 
Headquarters] will hereinafter be abbreviated as “Wuhan Notice” with their serial number (hao (号)) and 
date in the footnotes. Their full title will only be provided in the footnotes in case the notice lacks a serial 
number. 
186  Wuhan Fabu (武汉发布) [Wuhan Publishes], https://wemp.app/accounts/ed5d5acd-3f54-41da-
85e3-de32f161ffc3 and https://www.weibo.com/u/2759348142?nick=武汉发布&is_hot=1.  
187  See Armin von Bogdandy & Pedro A. Villarreal, International Law on Pandemic Response: A 
First Stocktaking in Light of the Coronavirus Crisis 18 (MPIL Research Paper No. 2020-07, March 26, 
2020), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3561650. 
188  Wuhan Notice 1 (Jan. 23, 2020), CLI.12.1563952, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-
01/23/content_5471751.htm.  
189  Id.  
190  See IHR art. 18, § 1. 
191  Id. 
192  See Diseases Law art. 43, § 2; PHE Regulation art. 33, § 2.  
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Therefore, the blockade notice was beyond prefectural-level Wuhan’s 
authority. 
However, the national-level Ministry of Transport substantially 
tightened the lockdown on the same day Wuhan announced it.193  The 
ministry forbade all persons outside the city from entering it, which Wuhan 
officials never mentioned or expressed an intention to do.194 Originally, the 
city had only announced “soft measures” like canceling mass events and 
promoting handwashing on January 21.195  But immediately after those 
announcements, on January 22, central-level representative Sun Chunlan 
undertook an “inspection tour” of Wuhan. She ordered local “party and 
government cadres” to first and foremost “prevent the spread of the 
epidemic to other regions.”196 The next day, Wuhan abruptly announced its 
blockade toward the outside.197 
Inside the blockaded city, personal movement was merely limited 
rather than forbidden. Public transportation was suspended,198 taxi traffic 
was limited, 199  and the Yangtze River Tunnel was closed. 200  Shortly 
thereafter, individual traffic was restricted except for goods’ transporters, 
public authorities, and vehicles authorized to transport residents in urgent 
cases. 201  All operating cars were regularly disinfected, and drivers’ 
temperatures were regularly measured. 202  For residents in need, both 
urgent transport and the delivery of comestibles and medicine were offered 
 
 
193  Guanyu Zuohao Jinchu Wuhan Jiaotong Yunshu Gongju Guankong Quanli Zuohao Yiqing 
Fangkong Gongzuo de Jinji Tongzhi (关于做好进出武汉交通运输工具管控全力做好疫情防控工作
的紧急通知) [Urgent Notice on Doing the Control of Traffic and Transportation Means Leaving and 
Entering Wuhan Well [and on] With Full Force Doing the Pandemic Prevention and Control Work Well] 
(Jan. 23, 2020), CLI.4.338894, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2020-
01/23/content_5471864.htm [hereinafter Traffic Notice (Jan. 23)]. 
194  Id. art. 1. 
195  Liao Jun (廖君) & Li Changzheng (黎昌政), Wuhan Chengli Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu 
Ganran Feiyan Yiqing Fangkong Zhihuibu (武汉成立新型冠状病毒感染肺炎疫情防控指挥部) 
[Wuhan Establishes COVID-19 Headquarters], XINHUAWANG (Jan. 21, 2020), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-01/21/c_1125487978.htm.  
196  Sun Chunlan, Zai Wuhan Kaocha Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan Yiqing 
Fangkong Gongzuoshi Qiangdiao: Yashi Zeren, Yange Luoshi, Jianding Ezhi Yiqing Kuosan Manyan 
(孙春兰在武汉考察新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎疫情防控工作时强调 压实责任 严格落实 坚决遏制
疫情扩散蔓延 ) [When Investigating the COVID-19 Prevention and Control Work in Wuhan, 
Emphasizes: Compact Responsibility, Strictly Implement, Firmly Contain the Spread of the Pandemic], 
XINHUAWANG (Jan. 22, 2020), http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-01/22/c_1125495519.htm.  
197  Wuhan Notice 1 (Jan. 23, 2020). 
198  Id. 
199  Wuhan Notice 5 (Jan. 23, 2020), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-
01/24/content_5471944.htm. 
200  Wuhan Notice 6 (Jan. 24, 2020), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-
01/24/content_5472010.htm. 
201  Wuhan Notice 9 (Jan. 25, 2020), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-
01/25/content_5472165.htm. 
202  Traffic Notice (Jan. 23) art. 3, § 1. 
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without charge. 203  In order to further reduce personal movement and 
contact, Wuhan fostered online shopping and the contactless delivery of 
goods.204 
Another important element of phase one’s pandemic control was 
tracking individual patients.205 In accordance with international WHO law 
and guidelines, affected persons suffering from COVID-19 were isolated 
and suspected persons with fever symptoms quarantined, 206  either in 
hospitals or in temporary quarantine centers.207 Wuhan exceeded the WHO 
restrictions, however, by requiring individuals with fevers who 
confirmedly did not suffer from COVID-19 to quarantine at home.208 On 
February 2,209 the city’s quarantine regime became more “aggressive and 
systematic.”210 Close contacts of the infected and suspected were tracked 
down and subjected to medical inspection.211  Additionally, most close 
contacts—reminded that public security personnel would use force in case 
of noncooperation— 212 underwent other preventive measures like 
quarantining.213 Hotels, schools, and public buildings were converted into 
quarantine centers or temporary hospitals.214 Additionally, Wuhan erected 
two new hospitals in a record ten days, going viral over social media.215 
2. COVID-19 Headquarters and Basic Non-legislation. — Wuhan 
also published the “Wuhan’s Provisional Methods of COVID-19 
Prevention and Control,” providing several fundamental rules underlying 
particular COVID-19 notices.216  Wuhan’s Headquarters for COVID-19 
Prevention and Control enacted both the notices and Provisional 
 
 
203  Wuhan Notice 8 (Jan. 24, 2020), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-01/24/content_5472045.htm. 
204  Wuhan Notice 14 (Feb. 17, 2020), CLI.12.1567332, 
http://wjw.wuhan.gov.cn/ztzl_28/fk/tzgg/202004/t20200430_1197160.shtml. 
205  Wuhan Notice 7 (Jan. 24, 2020), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-01/24/content_5472017.htm.  
206  See Diseases Law art. 39, §§ 1:1, 1:2; IHR art. 18, § 1; WHO, Considerations for Quarantine 
of Individuals in the Context of Containment for Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), WHO (Mar. 19, 
2020), https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/331497.  
207  Wuhan Notice 7 (Jan. 24) art. 2. 
208  Wuhan Notice 7 (Jan. 24) art. 2. 
209 Wuhan Notice 10 (Feb. 2, 2020), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-02/02/content_5473924.htm.  
210  Jeremy Page, China’s Progress Against Coronavirus Used Draconian Tactics Not Deployed in 
the West, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-west-is-misinterpreting-
wuhans-coronavirus-progressand-drawing-the-wrong-lessons-11585074966.  
211  Wuhan Notice 10 (Feb. 2).  
212  Wuhan Notice 10 (Feb. 2); PHE Regulation art. 44. 
213  See Diseases Law art. 39, § 1:3. 
214  Page, supra note 210. 
215  Id. 
216  Wuhanshi Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan Yiqing Fangkong Zhanxing Banfa 
(武汉市新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎疫情防控暂行办法) [Interim Measures for the Prevention and 
Control of the Pneumonia Outbreak of Novel Coronavirus Infection in Wuhan] (Jan. 29, 2020), 
CLI.12.1563231, http://www.wuhan.gov.cn/zwgk/tzgg/202003/t20200316_972483.shtml [hereinafter 
Provisional Methods]. 
88 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 30 NO. 1 
 
Methods.217 As an ad hoc institution created in response to COVID-19, 
Wuhan’s COVID-19 Headquarters differed from the city’s standing 
headquarters: Wuhan’s Comprehensive Health Emergency Response 
Commission and Wuhan’s Patriotic Sanitary Campaign Committee. Yet, 
such ad hoc headquarters during pandemics should only be established on 
the national and provincial levels— 218 like Hubei’s Headquarters for 
COVID-19 Prevention and Control.219 On the prefectural level and below, 
in contrast, national law leaves the local governments in charge of 
pandemic response.220 Only the National PHE Response Plan, constituting 
lex inferior and lex prior, recommends establishing ad hoc headquarters at 
every local level. 221  One might argue that these national stipulations 
preclude Wuhan’s prefectural-level People’s Government from creating 
and delegating its state authority to a quasi-executive headquarters. 
However, this was not the case in Wuhan for the following four reasons. 
First, Wuhan’s COVID-19 Headquarters was established not by the 
Municipal Government, but rather by “the city.”222 Therefore, its creation 
was communicated not through an official governmental notice but 
through a newspaper report (and later reiterated by the COVID-19 
Headquarters itself).223 Second, Wuhan’s COVID-19 Headquarters is not a 
quasi-executive “local joint mechanism for COVID-19 prevention and 
control” of the Municipal Government, and thus a state institution.224 
Rather, it constitutes a mixed party–state organ, presided over by both 
Party Secretary Wang Zhonglin and Mayor Zhou Xianwang, and staffed 
with members of both Wuhan’s CCP Committee and Wuhan’s Municipal 
Government. 225  This violates national law, which stipulates that 
headquarters shall only consist of local government officials. 226  The 
institutional intermingling of party and state also results in their 
instrumental intermingling. Consequently, the Headquarters’ notices are 
 
 
217  See Liao & Li, supra note 195; Wuhanshi Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan 
Yiqing Fangkong Zhihuibu (武汉市新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎疫情防控指挥部) [hereinafter Wuhan’s 
COVID-19 Headquarters]. 
218  PHE Regulation art. 3, art. 4, § 1, art. 28. 
219  Hubeisheng Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran Feiyan Yiqing Fangkong Zhihuibu (湖北省
新型冠状病毒感染肺炎疫情防控指挥部), established Jan. 22, 2020 [hereinafter Hubei’s COVID-19 
Headquarters]. 
220  See Diseases Law art. 5, § 1:2; PHE Regulation art. 4, § 2; Nat’l Emergency Plan art. 2, § 4. 
221  Nat’l PHE Plan art. 2, § 1:2–3. 
222  Liao & Li, supra note 195.  
223  Id.; Provisional Methods art. 4, § 1. 
224  See Technical Guidelines, supra note 127; LAN & GUANG, supra note 133, at 92. 
225  Provisional Methods art. 4, § 1; see Liao & Li, supra note 195. 
226  PHE Regulation art. 4, § 1. However, Wuhan does not abide by this national stipulation for its 
standing emergency headquarters either; see Wuhan Emergency Plan art. 2, § 2:2; Wuhan PHE Plan 
art. 2, § 1:1.  
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mixed party-state normative documents that have the superior authority of 
the party over local state law. Third, Wuhan’s COVID-19 Headquarters 
was not explicitly granted powers for enacting such normative documents. 
Rather, the Headquarters itself assumed “comprehensive authority for 
pandemic prevention and control of the whole city.”227 
Fourth, both the existence and authority of Wuhan’s COVID-19 
Headquarters were approved after the fact. However, the approving organ 
was Hubei’s Provincial Government and not Wuhan’s Municipal 
Government that would have had the legal authority for this approval.228 
The Provincial Government endorsed establishing “leading institutions” on 
the prefectural and county levels,229 resulting in the creation of COVID-19 
headquarters in Wuhan’s districts.230 Hubei’s Government also confirmed 
that local headquarters should exert “unified leadership and command” 
over Wuhan’s COVID-19 management.231  
D. Wuhan’s COVID-19 Control, Phase Two: Shutdown Inside 
Some argue that Wuhan’s omnicompetent COVID-19 Headquarters 
had already turned the tide toward success in pandemic containment on 
February 2,232 when it tightened the city’s quarantine regime for individual 
COVID-19 sufferers and suspects.233 However, neither national leaders nor 
local decision-makers shared this opinion.234 During phase one’s lockdown, 
most individuals were prohibited from leaving Wuhan, but—depending on 
their neighborhood’s COVID-19 management—they could still leave their 
residence and move within the city.235 Thus, the coronavirus was largely 
unable to spread outside Wuhan, but it could still spread inside the 
blockaded city. Therefore, the city entered a critical phase where hospitals 
began exceeding capacity.236 In response, Wuhan initiated phase two of 
COVID-19 control: a curfew-like shutdown of public life. 
 
 
227  Provisional Methods art. 4, § 2:1; see Liao & Li, supra note 195. 
228  Nat’l PHE Plan art. 2, § 1:2–3. 
229  Guanyu Jiaqiang Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan Fangkong Gongzuo de 
Tongzhi (关于加强新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎防控工作的通告) [Notice on Strengthening COVID-19 
Prevention and Control Work] (Jan. 22, 2020), CLI.12.1563626, https://www.hubei.gov.cn/xxgk/gsgg/
202001/t20200122_2013895.shtml, art. 1 [hereinafter Hubei Gov’t Notice (Jan. 22)]. 
230  E.g., Wuchangqu Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran Feiyan Yiqing Fangkong Zhihuibu (武
昌区新型冠状病毒感染肺炎疫情防控指挥部), established Jan. 2020. 
231  Hubei Gov’t Notice (Jan. 22) art. 1. 
232  Page, supra note 210. 
233  Wuhan Notice 10 (Feb. 2). 
234  See Wuhan Notice 11 (Feb. 10, 2020), CLI.12.1565245, 
http://wjw.wuhan.gov.cn/ztzl_28/fk/tzgg/202004/t20200430_1197237.shtml, art. 2. 
235  Residential Communities Across China Vary in Grassroots Coronavirus Prevention and 
Control, GLOBAL TIMES (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1180015.shtml.  
236  See Wuhan Notice 11 (Feb. 10). 
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1. Curfew through Non-legislation. — On February 10, all 
neighborhoods within the city were obligated to adopt a “closed 
management.”237 Individuals hindering this management were threatened 
with the use of force by public security officials.238 Through this brief, 
ambiguous notice, Wuhan drew a second, much tighter cordon sanitaire: 
around neighborhoods, like residential compounds or even single 
buildings.239 This second cordon resulted in a mass quarantine—240which, 
under international WHO law, is only permissible as an “additional health 
measure.” 241  Whether such mass quarantines are permitted during the 
coronavirus crisis, however, appears questionable. The IHR only permits 
quarantining specific individuals who are suspected to suffer from an 
infectious disease. 242  Nevertheless, the WHO praised Wuhan’s second 
cordon and its extension of quarantine measures against the entire 
population in February.243 Yet in March, the WHO’s COVID-19 official 
“Quarantine Considerations” again clarified that quarantines must address 
concretely suspected individuals only.244  
In contrast to WHO law, Chinese national law explicitly allows the 
“quarantine of [all] persons inside infectious disease areas.”245 Such mass 
quarantines can be decided and implemented at the prefectural and county 
levels by cities and districts themselves.246 However, as Wuhan’s mass 
quarantine constituted a considerable change of direction in COVID-19 
control, it again emanated not from the city but from the center, and not 
from the state but from the CCP. On February 13, the party center removed 
and replaced the Party Secretaries of Wuhan and Hubei for not sufficiently 
containing COVID-19.247 The newly installed Party Secretaries of Wuhan 
(Wang Zhonglin) and Hubei (Ying Yong) immediately implemented the 
party center’s requests for aggressive COVID-19 control. On February 14, 
Wuhan’s COVID-19 Headquarters tightened the closed management to a 
 
 
237  Wuhan Notice 12 (Feb. 10, 2020), CLI.12.1565246, copy at http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-
02/11/content_5477104.htm.  
238  Id. 
239  Philipp Renninger, China and COVID-19: A Central-Local ‘Chess Game’, THE DIPLOMAT 
(June 20, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/china-and-covid-19-a-central-local-chess-game/. 
240  See Bogdandy & Villareal, supra note 187, at 20 
241  IHR art. 43, § 1:1. 
242  IHR art. 1, § 1; art. 18, § 1; see Bogdandy & Villareal, supra note 187, at 20. 
243  WHO, supra note 8, at 10; Bogdandy & Villareal, supra note 187, at 20. 
244  WHO, supra note 8. 
245  See Diseases Law art. 41, § 1; PHE Regulation art. 33. 
246  See Diseases Law art. 41, § 1; PHE Regulation art. 33. 
247  Hubei Shengwei Zhuyao Zeren Tongzhi Zhiwu Tiaozheng, Ying Yong Ren Hubei Shengwei Shuji 
(湖北省委主要负责同志职务调整  应勇任湖北省委书记) [Positions of the Major Responsible 
Comrades of Hubei’s CCP Committee Have Been Adjusted: Ying Yong Serves as the Secretary of Hubei’s 
CCP Committee], XINHUAWANG (Feb. 13, 2020), http://xinhuanet.com/renshi/2020-
02/13/c_1125568253.htm.  
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real curfew for the vast majority of individuals, including those in Wuhan’s 
rural areas. 248  Non-gated neighborhoods were fenced and all 
neighborhoods were forced to operate one entry-exit checkpoint. 249 
Nobody could exit their residence except for two classes of people: (1) 
COVID-19 sufferers or suspects required to visit hospitals or quarantine 
centers, and (2) staff working in “pandemic prevention or sectors 
guaranteeing the operation [of the city],” like hospitals, pharmacies, public 
security, other crucial infrastructures, or the transport of goods. 250 
Similarly, nobody could enter another neighborhood except for special 
reasons similar to those for exiting.251 Nevertheless, Wuhan’s curfew-like 
shutdown was not handled uniformly because different districts, streets, 
and neighborhoods could choose the methods of entry-exit control 
according to their specific conditions.252  
On February 16, Hubei’s Provincial Government followed Wuhan’s 
COVID-19 Headquarters by applying the closed management curfew to 
most parts of the province.253 Additionally, Hubei extended this curfew to 
“public spaces”—which Wuhan subsequently implemented. 254  This 
extension meant that non-essential cultural, economic, and religious spaces 
had to close. 255  Essential businesses like shops, pharmacies, and 
accommodations could stay open, so long as they followed strict COVID-
19 regulations like measuring people’s temperature for fever and enforcing 
face mask compliance. 256  Moreover, anyone buying or ordering 
antipyretics or antitussives had to show their Resident Identity Card 
number, personal data, contact details, and emergency contacts. 257 
Wuhan’s COVID-19 Headquarters also instructed all individuals 
quarantined at home to measure their temperature twice a day,258 later 
 
 
248  Guanyu Mingque Zhuzhai Xiaoqu Fengbi Guanli Zhuyao Cuoshi de Tongzhi (关于明确住宅
小区封闭管理主要措施的通知) [Notice on Clarifying Major Measures for the Closed Management of 
Residential Neighborhoods] (Feb. 14, 2020), http://kuaibao.qq.com/s/20200218A0P12J00?refer=spider 
[hereinafter Wuhan Notice (Feb. 14)]. 
249  Id. art. 1.  
250  Wuhan Notice (Feb. 14) art. 2, § 1:2. 
251  Wuhan Notice (Feb. 14) art. 2, § 1:4. 
252  Wuhan Notice (Feb. 14) art. 2, § 1:1. 
253  Guanyu Jinyibu Qianghua Xinguan Feiyan Yiqing Fangkong de Tonggao (关于进一步强化新
冠肺炎疫情防控的通告) [Notice on Further Strengthening COVID-19 Prevention and Control] (Feb. 
16, 2020), http://jtt.hubei.gov.cn/xxzx/zhxx/hyzx/202007/t20200709_2573866.shtml, art. 2 [hereinafter 
Hubei Gov’t Notice (Feb. 16)]. 
254  Wuhan Notice 13 (Feb. 16, 2020), CLI.12.1567329, 
http://www.nhc.gov.cn/xcs/fkdt/202002/36437525a0d54cf99d386972b83c0731.shtml.  
255  Wuhan Notice 13 (Feb. 16) art. 1; see Hubei Gov’t Notice (Feb. 16) art. 4, § 2. 
256  Wuhan Notice 13 (Feb. 16) art. 2; see Hubei Gov’t Notice (Feb. 16) art. 4, § 3, art. 12, § 3. 
257  Wuhan Notice 13 (Feb. 16) art. 3; see Hubei Gov’t Notice (Feb. 16) art. 4, § 4. 
258  Wuhan Notice 15 (Feb. 20, 2020), CLI.12.1568838, 
http://wjw.wuhan.gov.cn/ztzl_28/fk/tzgg/202004/t20200430_1197090.shtml, art. 1. 
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recommended nationwide by the Joint Mechanism. 259  Individuals with 
temperatures exceeding 37.3 °C (99.1 °F) were required to immediately 
and honestly report to their residential community or village.260 The fever 
of individuals allowed (or obliged) to leave their residences was also 
measured at the entry-exit checkpoints of residential communities, villages, 
and neighborhoods.261 
2. Basic Legislation. — In addition to these normative documents, 
Wuhan resorted to formal legislation. On February 17, the city announced 
its “Decision on Winning the Wuhan Defense War of COVID-19 
Prevention and Control According to the Law and with Full Strength.”262 
Behind this martial title lies a local regulation enacted by Wuhan’s quasi-
legislative MPC Standing Committee. Other cities and provinces’ standing 
committees, including Hubei’s, 263  enacted similar COVID-19 
regulations.264 It is unsurprising that standing committees were the only 
quasi-legislative organs acting during the COVID-19 pandemic. Compared 
to local congresses themselves, they are smaller (in Wuhan: 51 versus 540 
delegates) 265  and meet more often (in Wuhan: six versus one regular 
session per year). 266  Yet, it is remarkable that standing committees 
formally legislated on COVID-19 at all. National law does not require local 
entities to enact formal legislation when responding to pandemic outbreaks. 
Nor do local entities depend on such formal local legislation to effectively 
manage a pandemic such as COVID-19. Instead, they can—and usually 




259  See Technical Guidelines, supra note 127, art. 1, § 1:2. 
260  See Diseases Law art. 12; Wuhan Notice 15 (Feb. 20) art. 3. 
261  Wuhan Notice 15 (Feb. 20) art. 2. 
262  Guanyu Yifa Quanli Daying Xinguan Feiyan Yiqing Fangkong Wuhan Baoweizhan de Jueding 
(关于依法全力打赢新冠肺炎疫情防控武汉保卫战的决定 ) (Feb. 17, 2020), CLI.12.1567050, 
http://www.wuhan.gov.cn/zwgk/tzgg/202003/t20200316_972587.shtml [hereinafter MPC Standing 
Comm. Decision]. 
263  Guanyu Wei Daying Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Feiyan Yiqing Fangkong Zujizhan Tigong 
Youli Fazhi Baozhang de Jueding (关于为打赢新型冠状病毒肺炎疫情防控阻击战提供有力法治保
障的决定) [Decision on Providing Powerful Rule of Law Guarantees for the Blockade War of COVID-
19 Prevention and Control] (Feb. 11, 2020) CLI.10.1565552, 
https://www.hubei.gov.cn/xxgk/gsgg/202002/t20200212_2024665.shtml [hereinafter Hubei People’s 
Cong. Standing Comm. Decision]. 
264  Hu Jian (胡健) & Wang Ying (王颖), Duodi Renda Changweihui Chutai Jueding Wei Yiqing 
Fangkong Tigong Fazhi Baozhang (多地人大常委会出台决定为疫情防控提供法治保障) [Standing 
Committees of Many People’s Congresses Issue Decisions Providing Rule of Law Guarantees for 
Pandemic Prevention and Control], ZHONGGUO RENDAWANG (Feb. 12, 2020), http://www.npc.gov.cn/
npc/c30834/202002/30ce4a31db2e48cd895c3f34076d6950.shtml. 
265  See Organization Law art. 41, § 4:2. 
266  See Organization Law art. 45, § 1.  
267  See Litigation Law arts. 53, 145. 
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But if local regulations are not necessary for an effective pandemic 
response, then why did standing committees enact them? In Wuhan’s case, 
the MPC Standing Committee’s decision helped the quasi-legislative 
organs emphasize their existence during the coronavirus crisis. This aim 
became obvious later on, in Wuhan’s MPC Standing Committee’s 
“Opinion on Further Developing the Role of Deputies of People’s 
Congresses at All Levels of the Whole City in Fighting COVID-19.”268 
The Standing Committee instructed all deputies of people’s congresses in 
Wuhan to “serve the masses” and fight “at the front” of COVID-19 
prevention and control.269 This front work should strengthen the deputies’ 
reputation and trust amongst residents and convince the population of “the 
people’s congress system’s advantages.”270 Nevertheless, Wuhan’s MPC 
Standing Committee accepted the leadership from both the CCP and the 
quasi-executive organs. The Standing Committee openly commanded the 
deputies of all the people’s congresses to implement the decisions of both 
the party committees and the people’s governments on their respective 
local levels.271  This stipulation reversed the state-internal hierarchy of 
institutions and norms, which favor the quasi-legislative organs and their 
local regulations over the quasi-executive organs and their regulatory 
instruments.272 But it respects the quasi-executive’s overarching authority 
and their normative documents’ importance in pandemic management. 
3. Enforcement. — The quasi-executive pandemic powers also 
encompass the authority to enforce legal and nonlegal COVID-19 related 
norms.273 These quasi-executive enforcement measures can be individual 
(applying to one or a few specific addressees) or concrete (applying to one 
or a few specific cases). Wuhan’s prefectural-level organs delegated large 
parts of enforcement authority to the grassroots level. The center 
standardized this grassroots-level COVID-19 work as late as three months 
after the pandemic outbreak. 274  In Wuhan, grassroots-level residential 
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communities, villages, and neighborhoods mostly performed analog 
surveillance because the “alert eyes” of residents’ committees were able to 
best monitor the closed management.275  
In contrast, digital surveillance remains more centralized. Chinese 
smartphone apps publicly display the domicile of COVID-19 infected 
individuals. 276  They also report users’ health status to authorities and 
generate a personal “QR Health Code” in traffic light colors through Alipay 
or the WeChat embed “Wuhan Fights the Pandemic.”277 A green QR code 
demonstrates that the user is healthy, a red QR code confirms that the 
person has—or is suspected of having—COVID-19, while a yellow QR 
code applies to people displaying “irregular conditions” like coughing, or 
who visited areas with COVID-19 cases. 278  Additionally, COVID-19 
contact tracing is conducted through countless surveillance cameras, face 
recognition technology, and location data. 279  Individual behavior like 
wearing face masks during phase one and two was monitored by drones,280 
which were also used to spray disinfectants, transport medical samples, and 
deliver consumer goods.281 
IV. EVALUATION: CRACKS IN THE SYSTEM? 
COVID-19 management in Wuhan demonstrates that local Chinese 
entities enacted concrete pandemic control measures while the underlying 
fundamental decisions emanated from the party and state center. However, 
individuals affected by COVID-19 restrictions cannot challenge the 
center’s fundamental COVID-19 decisions nor Wuhan’s implementation 
thereof. Consequently, Chinese party and state organs can unrestrictedly 
decide which COVID-19 measures to adopt without being held 
accountable to the impacted individuals. 
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A. Central–Local, Party–State Evaluation 
During the coronavirus crisis and beyond, Wuhan and other local 
entities must follow the central level’s command, which defines the 
“overall interest of the whole country.”282 But vice versa, Wuhan can also 
rely on the support of the center, and thus of the whole country. 
1. Wuhan as an Agent, COVID-19 as a Chess Game. — Both 
central–local command and support are realized through the horizontal and 
vertical channels of the party rather than the state. Put differently, central 
state organs do not lead local state organs directly but through a conduit: 
the CCP. This is possible because, on the central level, party leaders like 
Xi Jinping are personally identical to state leaders—and on the local levels, 
party secretaries are even superior to the leaders of state organs. As 
explained above, in Wuhan, Mayor Zhou Xianwang is subordinate to Party 
Secretary Wang Zhonglin because Zhou merely serves as Wuhan’s Deputy 
Party Secretary. This central–local and party–state setup allows the center 
to treat “the whole country as a chess game” in containing COVID-19, as 
Xi Jinping explicitly demanded. 283  When playing “COVID-19 chess,” 
China’s central-level leaders use these party–state chess pieces to perform 
three types of chess moves on the central–local chessboard.284 
First, central leadership regularly makes a triple move: horizontal–
vertical–horizontal.285 Central-level state leaders act as central-level party 
leaders (horizontal) in order to control the local party branch of Wuhan 
(vertical). 286  This local party branch, consisting of Wuhan’s CCP 
Committee and various party groups, then influence the local state organs 
of Wuhan, like the WHC and WCDC (horizontal). This party conduit is 
regulated through institutional, personnel, and disciplinary valves. 287 
During the coronavirus crisis, such a triple move introduced Wuhan’s 
shutdown in phase two. Central-level leaders, in their roles as party leaders, 
decided to replace Wuhan’s and Hubei’s Party Secretaries.288 The newly 
installed Party Secretaries then pressured Wuhan’s local pandemic 
containment organs to tighten and enforce the closed management.289 
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Second, and usually in a time of crisis, this chain of command is 
reduced to a double move: horizontal–vertical. 290  Central-level state 
leaders again act as central-level party leaders (horizontal), but now they 
directly command Wuhan’s local organs responsible for pandemic 
management (vertical).291 During the coronavirus crisis, the party center 
often issued orders to Wuhan’s COVID-19 Headquarters, which is bound 
to party commands because it constitutes a mixed party–state organ.292 
Such a double move initiated Wuhan’s lockdown in phase one. Central-
level representative Sun Chunlan commanded Wuhan’s COVID-19 
Headquarters to cordon off the city from the outside, 293  which the 
Headquarters implemented the very next day.294 Besides, the party center 
even assumes direct command over Wuhan’s local state organs, which are 
bound to party commands because of the non-contradiction principle.295 
During the coronavirus crisis, Wuhan’s MPC Standing Committee has 
openly embraced calls to assume command of not only Wuhan’s CCP 
Committee but also the CCP Central Committee.296 
Third, and exceptionally, the central level can immediately act on its 
own in local affairs. 297  This is possible because the center possesses 
omnicompetence for every (non-)legislative matter in the P.R.C.298 This 
direct approach causes a single, vertical move because the center’s 
micromanagement must still be enforced by local party and state organs. 
During the coronavirus crisis, this single move heralded phase three of 
COVID-19 containment, analyzed below.299 Since Wuhan had originally 
enacted COVID-19 restrictions, it would have had the authority to repeal 
them as an actus contrarius. However, it was not the city but the central 
level that announced the easing of COVID-19 measures in Wuhan.300  
Thus, when fighting COVID-19 through its local party and state 
organs, Wuhan acts as a mere agent of the central level.301 But even as an 
agent following central-level decisions, Wuhan must “combine” these 
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decisions “with the city’s actual situation.”302 Being an agent only means 
that the city is banned from acting as a principal pursuing its own interests, 
or as a representative defending its residents’ interests from excessive 
central-level commands.303 This type of agency explains why the formal 
decentralization of (non-)legal instruments is not contradictory to the 
substantial recentralization of political leadership under Xi Jinping. 304 
Paradoxically, decentralized (non-)legislation by local entities can even 
turn into a chess tactic of top-down governance, top-level design, and 
centralized ideological control.305 
2. Cooperation and Conflicts. — As a central-level agent, Wuhan 
bears responsibility for the entire P.R.C. “If Wuhan wins, Hubei wins; if 
Hubei wins, the whole country wins;” failure is unacceptable.306 However, 
Wuhan did not struggle alone, but it received support from other P.R.C. 
entities. First, the center and other local entities supported Wuhan’s 
medical fight against COVID-19. From January 24 on—and thus 
immediately after the lockdown—other provinces and the People’s 
Liberation Army sent medical staff and supplies to Wuhan (having a 
seldom “special reasons” to enter the city).307 According to official figures, 
35,000 medical workers from all over the country volunteered in Wuhan.308 
Second, Hubei province is establishing an internal “prevention and control 
network of the province, cities, counties (districts), townships (streets), and 
villages (residential communities).” 309  Third, the sub-local residential 
communities, villages, and neighborhoods enforced Wuhan’s COVID-19 
related decisions on the ground. These grassroots-level entities’ 
importance was acknowledged by the highest levels of party and state, 
including Xi Jinping.310  
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However, in containing COVID-19, the autonomy of grassroots-
level entities had detrimental outcomes for affected individuals. With 
regards to COVID-19 prevention, Wuhan’s municipal administration 
permitted a banquet with record-breaking attendance amidst the viral 
outbreak, arguing that it constituted an important element of residential 
communities’ self-government. 311  And concerning COVID-19 control, 
residential communities and neighborhoods handled the closed 
management disparately and often with more restrictive measures than 
advertised by the city.312 From the perspective of Wuhan’s prefectural level, 
the grassroots level’s autonomy thus created problems for the top-down 
implementation of the city’s COVID-19 stipulations.  
In turn, from the central level’s perspective, the city’s own freedom 
to operate created economic and financial problems as a consequence of 
the coronavirus crisis.313 Although the central level warned local entities 
not to overspend during the coronavirus crisis, provinces and cities planned 
on incurring debts.314 Local entities considered these debts necessary to 
finance crisis-related expenses, compensate tax losses, and stimulate the 
local economy, with value-added industrial production down 13.5% and 
fixed-asset investment down 24.5% in the first two months of 2020.315  
B. Political–Legal Evaluation 
While local entities can dispute economic policy questions in public, 
they cannot openly disagree with the center’s superior aim and overall 
direction of COVID-19 management.316 These taboos prevented Wuhan 
from finding balanced solutions for the coronavirus crisis, and restricted 
citizens from challenging Wuhan’s COVID-19 response. 
1. Absolute Aim: Eliminating COVID-19. — The central level’s aim 
for COVID-19 management was similar to several other countries, like 
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Australia, 317  New Zealand, 318  and South Korea: 319  stopping and 
eliminating the disease by suppressing new cases.320 In a nearly opposite 
approach, countries like—at least initially—the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden, aimed at stopping COVID-19 through herd 
immunity, thereby letting the coronavirus rapidly infect large parts of the 
population.321 But such laissez-faire strategies can easily overwhelm each 
state’s health care system and result in tragically high death tolls.322 These 
results also hold true if deliberate exposure is combined with mitigation, 
that is, cocooning risk groups from COVID-19 by limiting their social 
interaction.323 In contrast, most states aim not at stopping COVID-19 at all 
costs nor letting the disease roam freely—but at flattening the curve. These 
states accept a certain number of new infections while trying to 
significantly decelerate the disease’s spread amongst their populations.324 
The idea is that flattening the curve will prevent exponential growth in 
COVID-19 infections and thus preserve a health care system’s capacity to 
adequately address the crisis.325  
Most countries base their flattening approach on the assumption that 
eliminating COVID-19 by preventing any new infections is scientifically 
impossible. 326  In this light, China’s approach (like Australia’s, New 
Zealand’s, and South Korea’s) to eliminate COVID-19 within their 
countries would be criticized for being unscientific and irrational.327 Yet, 
one should not quickly dismiss these states’ approach as illogical. Rather, 
their aim to suppress any new COVID-19 cases proves logical in any one 
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of the following scenarios: First, if a vaccine, medication, or treatment for 
COVID-19 is distributed so soon that preventing any new infections until 
then appears both possible and worth the harsh restrictions of public and 
private life.328 Second, if the novel coronavirus mutates so significantly 
that the immunity of previously infected individuals wanes and the other 
countries’ strategy of immunity through infection fails. Or third, if 
COVID-19’s infection rate becomes so high that allowing the virus to 
infect large swaths of people, even within the health care systems’ capacity, 
would result in millions of deaths.329 Should any of these scenarios unfold, 
then China’s approach (like Australia’s, New Zealand’s, and South 
Korea’s) becomes a “rational,” “scientific,” 330  and legitimate 
governmental aim.331 
2. Proportionality and Balancing of COVID-19 Control? — 
Defining the legitimate governmental aim as completely eliminating 
COVID-19 yields grave human rights consequences: the reference point 
for the proportionality test of COVID-19 measures shifts. The reason being 
that the proportionality of government measures—encompassing their (1) 
suitability, (2) necessity, and (3) proportionality stricto sensu 
(appropriateness/balancing)—is measured in relation to that legitimate 
aim.332 International WHO law specifies this proportionality test for PHEs, 
infectious diseases, and pandemics. According to the IHR, public health 
“measures shall not be more restrictive of international traffic and not more 
invasive or intrusive to persons than reasonably available alternatives” that 
would also achieve an “appropriate level of health protection.”333 Also, 
these health-related measures must “full[y] respect” and appropriately 
balance “the dignity, human rights, and fundamental freedoms of persons” 
(i.e., proportionality stricto sensu).334 
For countries like China that aim to eliminate COVID-19, much 
stricter measures appear suitable, necessary, and proportionate stricto 
sensu, than for countries that merely aim at flattening the curve. First, the 
complete lockdown and shutdown of the pandemic’s epicenter, combined 
with strict surveillance and contact tracing, reduced new COVID-19 cases 
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in Wuhan to virtually zero.335 Therefore, Wuhan’s measures were suitable 
for reaching the aim of stopping the pandemic.336  Second, hardly any 
alternatives existed that would have been less restrictive, but equally 
suitable for eliminating the city’s massive and exponentially growing 
COVID-19 clusters. Thus, in relation to their aim of absolutely eliminating 
the pandemic, Wuhan’s measures could be considered necessary. 337 
However, third, Wuhan’s measures failed to be proportionate stricto sensu, 
that is, to appropriately balance pandemic containment and individual 
rights and freedoms. 338  Certainly, strict COVID-19 measures protect 
society’s and individuals’ rights to life, health, and “safety.”339 Yet, the 
Chinese Constitution does not guarantee these rights. Rather, it is the other 
way round. The Chinese Constitution enshrines myriad human rights that 
Wuhan’s COVID-19 control actually encroached on: the freedom of the 
person and movement,340 the freedom of demonstration and assembly,341 
religious freedom,342 the right (and duty) to work and education,343 the 
inviolability of home and correspondence, 344  as well as the rights of 
Overseas Chinese. 345  These COVID-19 measures affected millions for 
several months without any realistic possibility of an exception. 
Consequently, Wuhan’s COVID-19 control came at an excessive price and 
fails the proportionality test. Neither did it “full[y] respect” nor 
appropriately balance the “human rights and fundamental freedoms” of 
urban dwellers or other affected individuals.346 
This disproportionality, however, will hardly distress Wuhan’s party 
and state leaders. First, in most countries, proportionality has been 
accepted as a “general principle of law” and “common [constitutional] 
grammar” by lawmakers and courts.347 In the United States, the “balancing 
doctrine” fulfils a similar function.348 Chinese law, in contrast, rejects a 
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general principle of proportionality or balancing, despite long-standing 
efforts by legal scholars to establish this principle.349 Rather, local and 
central law and nonlaw must only be “scientific” and “rational.”350 It is 
surprising then, that in emergency situations like pandemics, Chinese law 
requires both central and local entities to act more carefully than in “normal” 
times.351 All entities must choose measures that are “suitable for the nature, 
degree, and extent of the (social) damage caused by the emergency” (i.e., 
suitability) and “conducive to the maximum protection of rights and 
interests of citizens, in case there are multiple options available for choice” 
(i.e., necessity).352 However, Wuhan’s party and state organs could always 
argue that less restrictive options for achieving the government’s aim of 
absolutely eliminating COVID-19 were unavailable.353 Moreover, whether 
during emergencies or regular times, neither Wuhan’s (non-)law nor its 
enforcement measures need to be proportionate stricto sensu.354 Chinese 
law allows—and sometimes demands—cities like Wuhan to violate 
individuals’ rights and interests in fighting PHEs.355 
3. Legal Remedies Against COVID-19 Control? — As a second 
pitfall to Wuhan’s COVID-19 response, individuals affected by Wuhan’s 
measures can only initiate legal actions concerning the individual and 
concrete enforcement measures, like administrative acts, compulsory 
measures, or sanctions.356 There are, in contrast, no legal remedies against 
Wuhan’s general and abstract (non-)law that the enforcement is based 
on.357 Wuhan’s only formal legal norm regulating its COVID-19 response, 
the MPC Standing Committee’s Decision, is outside the scope of judicial 
review because it constitutes a local regulation.358 And Wuhan’s numerous 
nonlegal COVID-19 normative documents can be reviewed by the courts 
only incidentally.359 The courts can rule on normative documents’ legality 
indirectly, but only in the frame of legal actions concerning the individual 
and concrete enforcement measures that they are based on.360 Should this 
incidental control find one of Wuhan’s normative documents unlawful, 
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Legality and Legal Remedies], 45 VERFASSUNG IN RECHT UND ÜBERSEE [VRÜ] 412, 423 (2012). 
350  Legislation Law art. 6; see also, IHR art. 43, § 2. 
351  Emergencies Law art. 11; Pils, supra note 312 (critically). 
352  Emergencies Law art. 11. 
353  Pils, supra note 312. 
354  See Ahl, supra note 349, at 423. 
355  Emergencies Law art. 11; Pils, supra note 312 (critically). 
356  See Ahl, supra note 349, 425–26. 
357  See Litigation Law art. 2; art. 12; see Diseases Law art. 12, § 2. 
358  FENG, supra note 52, at 88. 
359  See Ahl, supra note 349, 425–26; Litigation Law art. 64; Litigation Interpretation art. 145. 
360  See Litigation Law art. 64; Litigation Interpretation art. 145. 
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then the particular court must not apply the respective document as a valid 
basis in the concrete lawsuit. 361  But the court cannot strike down the 
normative document’s validity and authority generally.362 As of December 
2020, several such COVID-19 lawsuits are pending against Wuhan’s 
Municipal Government and Hubei’s Provincial Government.363 However, 
plaintiffs have not based their claims on the disproportionality of Wuhan’s 
COVID-19 control. Rather, they criticize the absence or inadequacy of 
Wuhan’s COVID-19 prevention. 364  And where plaintiffs challenge 
Wuhan’s COVID-19 control, they do not base their claims on the defects 
of the city’s normative documents, which have therefore not been 
incidentally examined. Instead, these lawsuits criticize the defective 
application of those normative documents by individual officials.365 
As a third problem, administrative litigation is only seldom 
successful in China. Plaintiffs win approximately 20% of administrative 
cases and often face (increased) harassment from the local government 
after filing suit.366 In the PHE and pandemic context, litigation is actively 
discouraged by Chinese law. The Diseases Law requires all individuals and 
all entities to “accept the prevention and control measures” by pandemic 
containment organs.367 And all people suffering or suspected to suffer from 
an infectious disease, as well as their close contacts, must “cooperate” with 
the health administration—or their compliance will be enforced by public 
security organs.368 If individuals dare “refuse to carry out the prevention 
and control measures” or “disobey the decisions or orders” issued by 
pandemic containment organs, they expose themselves to criminal 
punishment,369 administrative sanctions, and civil liability.370 As a result, 
almost 2,000 citizens have already been criminally charged for 
“obstructing” COVID-19 containment.371 Nationally, COVID-19 related 
“misbehavior” resulted in 3,600 individuals being criminally detained, 
 
 
361  See Litigation Law art. 64; Litigation Interpretation art. 149, § 1. 
362  Litigation Interpretation art. 149, § 1. 
363  See Lily Kuo, ‘People Have Been Awakened’: Seeking Covid-19 Answers in Wuhan, GUARDIAN 
(Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/20/people-have-been-awakened-
seeking-covid-19-answers-in-wuhan. 
364  Id. 
365  Id. 
366  Wei Cui & Zhiyuan Wang, The Selection of Litigation against Government Agencies: Evidence 
from China, 13 REV. LAW ECON., article no. 20160054, 16–17 (2017). 
367  See Diseases Law art. 12, § 1. 
368  PHE Regulation art. 44. 
369  Criminal Law art. 330, § 1:4, § 2; see Emergencies Law art. 68; PHE Regulation art. 51, § 3. 
370  See Diseases Law art. 77; Emergencies Law art. 66–67; PHE Regulation art. 51, § 1–2. 
371  Ye, supra note 135. 
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25,000 individuals administratively detained, and 46,000 individuals 
“criticized and educated” by February 2020 alone.372 
As a fourth and last caveat, individuals cannot assert their human 
rights claims in court, regardless of whether they sue the state or if the state 
sues them. Myriad human rights (and duties) are enshrined in the Chinese 
Constitution. 373  However, these rights are neither enforceable nor 
justiciable, not even through incidental control by the courts.374 Moreover, 
the Chinese Constitution demands that “in exercising their freedoms and 
rights,” citizens “must not infringe upon the interests of the state, the 
society, or the collective.”375 Therefore, the public interest—in this case 
containing COVID-19—prevails over individual rights and freedoms.376 
Again, Chinese law permits—and sometimes demands—local entities like 
Wuhan to violate individuals’ rights and interests in fighting PHEs.377  
C. Wuhan’s COVID-19 Control, Phase Three: Easing and Extension 
China’s legal setup explains why Wuhan could fight a “total war” 
on COVID-19, as required by the party and state center.378 This “field 
service” in Wuhan for the higher levels of the party and the state was most 
notably performed by Wuhan’s COVID-19 Headquarters.379 The center 
and province burdened Wuhan’s Headquarters with conveying the “bad 
news” of restrictions, like the lockdown and shutdown in phases one and 
two, and with enforcing these measures on the ground.380 In contrast, the 
center and province reserved for themselves the privilege of proclaiming 
the “good news,” such as easing Wuhan’s strict COVID-19 measures.381  
This easing initiated a new phase of COVID-19 containment in 
Wuhan, yet the alleviation granted was still limited. Therefore, Wuhan’s 
 
 
372  Xiong Jian (熊建), Quanguo Yiliao Jiuzhi Zhixu Zongti Pingwen Youxu (全国医疗救治秩序
总体平稳有序) [The Whole Country’s Medical Treatment Order Is Generally Stable and Orderly], 
RENMIN RIBAO (Feb. 22, 2020), http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2020-
02/22/content_1972481.htm; see Pils, supra note 312. 
373  XIANFA art. 33–56. 
374  Bu, supra note 65, at 788. 
375  XIANFA art. 51. 
376  Pils, supra note 312. 
377  With the MPC Standing Committee’s Decision, Wuhan can violate human rights because the 
Decision constitutes a local regulation; see Legislation Law art. 82. With Wuhan’s COVID-19 normative 
documents, the city can infringe upon individual rights and freedoms as long as national law authorizes 
it; see Litigation Law art. 64; Litigation Interpretation art. 148, § 2:2–3. 
378  Hu, supra note 6. 
379  See Xi, supra note 5; Hubei Gov’t Notice (Jan. 22) art. 1. 
380  See Renninger, supra note 239. 
381  This is style of news was often given through the Hubeisheng Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu 
Ganran Feiyan Yiqing Fangkong Zhihuibu Tonggao (湖北省新型冠状病毒感染肺炎疫情防控指挥部
通告) [Notices of Hubei’s COVID-19 Headquarters]. Hereinafter, these notices will be abbreviated in 
the footnotes as “Hubei Notice” with their respective date instead of providing this full title again. 
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COVID-19 measures continued to restrict public and private life inside the 
city for several months. Meanwhile, the focus of China’s COVID-19 
containment shifted toward its borders, restricting the return of foreign 
nationals and Chinese citizens from abroad. 
1. Successive Easing. — Easing Phase two’s shutdown began in 
mid-March when Wuhan cautiously “resumed work, production, city (life), 
and teaching.” 382  First, shops and factories reopened. 383  Companies 
“necessary to guarantee pandemic prevention and control work … the 
operation of public utilities … and people’s daily necessities” were allowed 
to reopen on March 11, whereas non-essential businesses reopened ten 
days later. 384  Second, public transportation started operating again on 
several lines by March 25, reviving city life.385 As a prerequisite to using 
public transportation, passengers were required to register on a smartphone 
app, and scan the QR code of every vehicle they were traveling on.386 Third, 
Wuhan’s schools and universities, home to more than 2.5 million 
students,387 resumed teaching on different dates beginning in early May.388  
Phase one’s lockdown was eased beginning at the end of March.389 
The central level decided, 390  and the provincial level reiterated, that 
 
 
382  See Shi Lingdao Diaodu Quanshi Fugong Fuchan Fushi Gongzuo (市领导调度全市复工复产
复市工作) [Municipal Leaders Schedule the Whole City to Resume Work, Production, and City [Life]], 
ZHONGGONG WUHAN SHIWEI TONGYI ZHANXIAN GONGZUOBU (中共武汉市委统一战线工作部) 
[UNITED FRONT WORKING DEP’T OF WUHAN PARTY COMM.] (Mar. 23, 2020), 
http://whtzb.org/home/info/17555.html.  
383  Hubei Notice (Mar. 11, 2020), CLI.12.1575971, art. 1, § 1 
http://yjt.hubei.gov.cn/yjgl/ztzl/xxgzbdfk/yqdt/202003/t20200311_2179176.shtml. 
384  Hubei Notice (Mar. 11) art. 1, § 1. 
385  Wang Gang (王刚), Wei Chengzuo Gongjiao Xu Shiming Dengji, Saoma Gongzuo Renyuan 
Youquan Jujue Qi Shangche (未乘坐公交须实名登记 扫码工作人员有权拒绝其上车) [Those Who 
Have Not Used Public Transportation Yet Must Real-Name Register; Code-Scanning Staff Can Refuse 
Boarding], CHANGJIANG RIBAO (Mar. 27, 2020) [YANGTZE DAILY], 
http://www.wuhan.gov.cn/sy/whyw/202004/t20200414_998925.shtml. 
386  Id. 
387  Wuhanshi Tongjiju, supra note 40. 
388  Hubei Notice (Apr. 20, 2020), CLI.12.1587893, 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index/content/2020-04/20/content_8173950.htm, art. 2. 
389 NHC et al., Guanyu Zuohao Youguan Renyuan Jinchu Hubeisheng Jiaotong Yunshu Baozhang 
Gongzuo de Tongzhi (关于做好有关人员进出湖北省交通运输保障工作的通知) [Notice on Doing 
the Traffic and Transport Safeguarding Work of Relevant Persons Entering and Leaving 
Hubei Province Well] (Mar. 24, 2020), CLI.4.340778, art 4, § 2, art. 6, § 2, 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2020-03/25/content_5495238.htm, [hereinafter Traffic Notice 
(Mar. 24)]. 
390  NHC et al., Guanyu Zuohao Youguan Renyuan Jinchu Hubeisheng Jiaotong Yunshu Baozhang 
Gongzuo de Tongzhi (关于做好有关人员进出湖北省交通运输保障工作的通知) [Notice on Doing 
the Traffic and Transport Safeguarding Work of Relevant Persons Entering and Leaving Hubei Province 
Well] (Mar. 24, 2020), CLI.4.340778, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2020-
03/25/content_5495238.htm, art. 4, § 2, art. 6, § 2 [hereinafter Traffic Notice (Mar. 24)]. 
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entering and exiting Hubei province was allowed again on March 25.391 
Wuhan, however, was excluded until later. Inbound transport by train 
restarted on March 28,392 and other transportation means, like private road 
traffic, reopened on April 8.393  Outbound transportation too started up 
again that same day, as did the airport in a limited capacity.394 In total, 
Wuhan’s lockdown had remained in force for more than two months. 
During this time, millions of people were stranded either inside or outside 
the city. For example, transient travelers, who unfortunately passed 
through Wuhan on January 23, were then locked inside the city without 
their own accommodations.395 And migrant workers in or from Wuhan, 
who had returned to their homes for Chinese New Year’s public holidays, 
were unable to travel back to their jobs.396 As a remedy, Wuhan’s COVID-
19 departments decided that individuals could enter or exit the city “for 
reasons of pandemic prevention and control, city functioning, production, 
and living” as “early” as February 24.397 However, Wuhan was forced to 
revoke that permission the same day because it had been issued “without 
the consent of leading comrades” at the central level.398 Instead, the central 
level itself announced the dates and conditions for transient travelers and 
migrant workers entering and exiting Wuhan a month later.399 The center 
proclaimed that the “preferential” entry-exit rules for Wuhan applied only 
to migrant workers. 400  Additionally, the center changed the date for 
migrant workers entering and exiting the city from February 24 to March 
25. 401  The center also required migrant workers entering and exiting 
Wuhan to travel by chartered bus and to produce a negative COVID-19 
nucleic acid test before traveling.402 
 
 
391  Hubei Notice (Mar. 24, 2020), CLI.12.1579398, art. 1 
http://yjt.hubei.gov.cn/fbjd/dtyw/tt/202003/t20200324_2189538.shtml. 
392  Zhongguo Tielu Wuhanju Jituan Youxian Gongsi Tonggao (中国铁路武汉局集团有限公司
通 告 ) [Notice of China Railway Wuhan Group] art. 2 (Mar. 24, 2020), 
http://www.hubei.gov.cn/zhuanti/2020/xgfyyqfkzszq/hygq/202003/t20200324_2189903.shtml, 
[hereinafter Railway Notice]. 
393  Traffic Notice (Mar. 24) art. 4, § 2, art. 6, § 2; Hubei Notice (Mar. 24), art. 2, § 1. 
394  Traffic Notice (Mar. 24) art. 4, § 2, art. 6, § 2; Hubei Notice (Mar. 24) art. 2, § 3; Railway 
Notice art. 3. 
395  See He Huifeng, Coronavirus: Hubei’s Migrant Workers ‘Living in Fear’ as Debts Mount 
Under Lockdown, S. CHINA MORN. POST (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-
economy/article/3075732/coronavirus-hubeis-migrant-workers-living-fear-debts-mount. 
396  Id. 
397  Wuhan Notice 17, art. 3, § 1 (Feb. 24, 2020), https://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hans/关于加强进出
武汉市车辆和人员管理的通告. 
398  Wuhan Notice 18 (Feb. 24, 2020), http://www.cjrbapp.cjn.cn/p/163325.html. 
399  Traffic Notice (Mar. 24) art. 3–4; reiterated by Hubei Notice (Mar. 24) art. 1–3. 
400  Traffic Notice (Mar. 24) art. 3, § 2; Hubei Notice (Mar. 24) art. 2, § 2. 
401  Traffic Notice (Mar. 24) art. 3, § 3; Hubei Notice (Mar. 24) art. 2, § 2, art. 3. 
402  Traffic Notice (Mar. 24) art. 3, § 2, art. 2, § 2–3; Hubei Notice (Mar. 24) art. 2, § 2. 
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2. Limited Easing. — Easing Wuhan’s COVID-19 measures has 
been subject to high requirements not only for migrant workers, but also 
for everyone else. Concerning phase one’s lockdown, traveling in and out 
of Wuhan was initially restricted by other local entities like Beijing,403 and 
later by the central-level State Council’s Joint Mechanism.404 Individuals 
leaving Wuhan had to prove at their destination that they are COVID-19 
free. If they could not provide a negative COVID-19 nucleic acid test, then 
they must spend fourteen days in quarantine.405 
Regarding phase two’s shutdown, Wuhan’s COVID-19 
Headquarters ordered all local and grassroots levels within the city to 
“strictly continue” the closed management, but in a modified form.406 In 
order to exit and enter the city and any residential community, village, or 
neighborhood, every individual had to show their green QR health code.407 
All neighborhoods implemented the “four musts” on people entering or 
exiting their respective area: (1) show their Resident Identity Card, (2) 
specify personal information and contact details, (3) measure their 
temperature, and (4) wear a face mask.408 Citizens were still called on to 
not leave their house except in “absolutely necessary” scenarios.409 If new 
active COVID-19 cases appear, affected neighborhoods must implement 
stricter policies, similar to an absolutely closed management.410  
These limitations indicate that easing COVID-19 measures in 
Wuhan was not due to human rights and proportionality considerations, but 
rather to the center’s evaluation that the pandemic was sufficiently under 
control. Therefore, Xi Jinping allowed the CCP Leading Group dispatched 
 
 
403  Zuohao Lihan Fanjing Renyuan Hesuan Jiance Gongzuo (做好离汉返京人员核酸检测工作) 
[Doing the Nucleic Acid Test Work of Persons Leaving Wuhan and Returning to Beijing Well] (April 8, 
2020), http://wjw.beijing.gov.cn/xwzx_20031/wnxw/202004/t20200408_1797997.html.  
404  Guanyu Zuhao Lihan Renyuan Xinguan Feiyan Jiance he Jiankang Guanli Fuwu Gongzuo de 
Tongzhi (关于做好离汉人员新冠肺炎检测和健康管理服务工作的通知) [Notice on Doing the 
COVID-19 Testing of People Leaving Wuhan and Health Management Service Work Well] (Apr. 17, 
2020), CLI.4.341493, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-04/18/content_5503879.htm [hereinafter Joint 
Mechanism Notice (Apr. 17)]. 
405  Joint Mechanism Notice (Apr. 17) art. 3–5. 
406  Guanyu Jianli Yiqing Fangkong Changxiao Jizhi Chixu Zuohao Xiaoqu Fengkong Guanli 
Gongzuo de Tongzhi (关于建立疫情防控长效机制持续做好小区封控管理工作的通知) [Notice on 
Establishing a Long-Term Mechanism for Pandemic Prevention and Control [and on] Continuing to Do 
the Closed Management Work of Neighborhoods Well] art. 3–4 (Apr. 2, 2020), 
https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1662973705793662636&wfr=spider&for=pc, [hereinafter Wuhan 
Notice (Apr. 2)]. 
407  Traffic Notice (Mar. 24) art. 3, § 2, art. 4, § 2, art. 6, § 2; Hubei Notice (Mar. 24) art. 2, § 3, 
art. 3, § 1. 
408  Wuhan Notice (Apr. 2) art. 4. 
409  Wuhan Notice (Apr. 2) art. 4. 
410  See Technical Guidelines, supra note 127, art. 21, § 11. 
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to Wuhan under Sun Chunlan to return to Beijing in late April.411 But, Xi 
emphasized that maintaining COVID-19 containment is the “first 
priority.”412 Hence, easing restrictions in Wuhan does not mean a return to 
the status quo pre-COVID-19, but a transition to phase three of COVID-19 
management. 
3. Continuing Restrictions and the New Normal. — Phase three of 
COVID-19 management—ongoing as of December 2020—is 
characterized by Wuhan’s aim to establish an “optimized multi-level 
leadership system” for COVID-19 prevention and control.413 However, in 
this optimized system, several restrictive COVID-19 measures remain.414 
The digital surveillance tools that were introduced, like the QR health 
codes, will likely continue well beyond the coronavirus crisis.415 Even as 
the pandemic abates, Xi Jinping has ordered “continuous screening” for 
COVID-19 cases.416 Moreover, Xi has announced that fighting COVID-19 
offers a welcome opportunity to “really ‘clean up’ the residential 
communities and the society as a whole.” 417  Following suit, Wuhan’s 
COVID-19 Headquarters has committed itself to regularly conduct 
“accurate and in-depth inspection tours” of entities within the city.418 The 
Headquarters has also obliged Wuhan’s districts to “establish working 
mechanisms for supervision and inspection and strictly enforce the 
disciplinary requirements and responsibility for neglecting duties.”419 
These continuing restrictions demonstrate that inside China, a 
certain “new normal” still prevails. This is unsurprising, given the ongoing 
coronavirus crisis is temporarily altering the ways people live in almost 
every country of the world.420 It remains to be seen, in contrast, whether 
 
 
411  Han Jie (韩洁), Zhongyang Zhidaozu Li’e Fanjing (中央指导组离鄂返京) [Central Leading 
Group Leaves Hubei [and] Returns to Beijing], XINHUAWANG (Apr. 27, 2020), 
www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-04/27/c_1125911889.htm.  
412  Xi, supra note 5; Wang Zuokui (王作葵) & Li Wei (李伟), “Jiefeng” Tongdao Budengyu 
Jiechu Fangyi (“解封”通道不等于解除防疫) [Wuhan: “Unblocking” Passageways Does Not Mean to 
Remove Pandemic Prevention], XINHUAWANG (Apr. 7, 2020), http://www.xinhuanet.com/2020-
04/07/c_1125824454.htm. 
413  Wuhan Notice (Apr. 2) art. 1; Wang & Li, supra note 412. 
414  Mozur et al., supra note 277; Satra, supra note 275; Lily Kuo, ‘The New Normal’: China’s 
Excessive Coronavirus Public Monitoring Could be Here to Stay, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 9, 2020), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/09/the-new-normal-chinas-excessive-coronavirus-
public-monitoring-could-be-here-to-stay.  
415  Digital surveillance was enhanced during other major events like the 2008 Beijing Olympics or 
the 2010 Shanghai Expo and has endured well beyond those events. See Kuo, supra note 414.  
416  Xi, supra note 5. 
417  Id. 
418  Wuhan Notice (Apr. 2) art. 5. 
419  Id. art. 7. 
420  See Jess Berentson-Shaw, Covid-19: Understanding the New Normal, RADIO N.Z. (Apr. 14, 
2020), https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/on-the-inside/414216/covid-19-understanding-the-new-normal. 
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the coronavirus crisis will create a new normal in economics,421 work,422 
politics, social life,423 and health care in the post-pandemic future too.424 In 
China, claims for a new normal have been an official mantra of Xi Jinping 
since 2014, long before the COVID-19 pandemic. 425  This slogan, 
originally related to China’s slower and more sustainable economic 
development,426 has expanded to various areas of Chinese governance, 
including the political–legal system.427 However, Xi’s new normal does 
not merely redefine but rather reverses normality in two regards. 
First, normality for Xi means crisis, as he turns the crisis mode into 
the normal mode of governance.428 This development has been facilitated 
by the coronavirus crisis. Both the center and local entities like Wuhan 
intend to “uphold the combination of emergency and normality” in 
COVID-19 containment for the near future. 429  Moreover, Wuhan is 
establishing a “normalized long-term prevention and control mechanism,” 
converting all urban governance into crisis containment for the indefinite 
future.430  
Second, normality for Xi means exception, as he promotes a 
permanent state of exception and emergency. 431  This has been openly 
embraced by parts of Chinese academia, like the neoconservative strand of 
Political Constitutionalism explicitly referring to Carl Schmitt. 432  Yet, 
liberal democracies are also increasingly using the state of emergency as a 
normal government technique too.433 Giorgio Agamben alleges that this 
 
 
421  See Hans Thalbauer, COVID-19: What is the New Normal?, FORBES (Apr. 6, 2020) 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sap/2020/04/06/covid-19-what-is-the-new-normal/#1be7cca67fb4.  
422  See #DEMOCRATIZINGWORK, https://democratizingwork.org. 
423  See Ethikrat, supra note 322, at 2. 
424  See Thomas H. Lee, Creating the New Normal: The Clinician Response to Covid-19, NEJM 
CATALYST (Mar. 17, 2020), https://catalyst.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/CAT.20.0076.  
425  Gu Qianjiang (顾钱江) et al., Xi Jinping Shouci Xitong Chanshu “Xinchangtai” (习近平首次
系统阐述“新常态”) [Xi Jinping for the First Time Systematically Elaborates on the “New Normal”], 
XINHUAWANG (Nov. 9, 2014), http://www.xinhuanet.com//world/2014-11/09/c_1113175964.htm. 
426  See Jing Zhang & Jian Chen, Introduction to China’s New Normal Economy, 15 J. CHIN. ECON. 
& BUS. STUD. 1 (2017), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14765284.2017.1289454. 
427  See Xiaodan Zhang, Die Änderung des Gesetzgebungsgesetzes der VRCh und die "neue 
Normalität" der Gesetzgebung in China [The Revision of the P.R.C. Legislation Law and the “New 
Normality” of Chinese Legislation], 48 VERFASSUNG UND RECHT IN ÜBERSEE [VRÜ] 443, 452 (2015). 
428  See CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM, supra note 36, at 159. 
429  CCP Resumption Opinion art. 2, § 1; Wuhan Notice (Apr. 2) art. 1; Hu, cited by Wang & Li, 
supra note 409.  
430  Wuhan Notice (Apr. 2) preamble. 
431  See generally ERNST FRAENKEL, THE DUAL STATE 11, 57 (Edward Albert Shils trans., Oxford 
Univ. Press, 1st ed. 1941) (for permanent and sometimes fancied states of exception). 
432  See Lucas Brang, Carl Schmitt and the Evolution of Chinese Constitutional Theory, 9 GLOB. 
CON. 117 (2020). 
433  See GÜNTER FRANKENBERG, POLITICAL TECHNOLOGY AND THE EROSION OF THE RULE OF LAW 
(2015); Matthias Lemke, What Does State of Exception Mean? A Definitional and Analytical Approach, 
28 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR POLITIKWISSENSCHAFT [ZPOL] 373, 374 (2018). 
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development has been fomented by the coronavirus crisis because many 
liberal democracies proclaim national emergencies and resort to 
emergency powers.434 It could therefore seem surprising that the P.R.C. has 
only proclaimed provincial-level public health emergencies, 435  but no 
nation-wide state of emergency that would have allowed authorities to 
employ exceptional measures.436 Yet, the reason simply is that Chinese 
authorities do not need to use formally available emergency powers for 
containing COVID-19. They can immediately rely “on the full force of the 
everyday coercive apparatus” within China—which has normalized the 
exceptional for decades.437 
4. Shifting Restrictions and the New Cordon Sanitaire. — 
Meanwhile, the main focus of China’s and Wuhan’s COVID-19 
restrictions has shifted externally. Chinese authorities now see their 
greatest epidemiological threat originating from abroad: reimportation of 
COVID-19 from other countries. 438  In response, China developed a 
strategy of isolating itself from foreign countries.  
First, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the National 
Immigration Administration began banning most foreigners from entering 
China in late March.439 Until late September, even those foreigners holding 
a residence permit were locked out.440 Under international WHO law, this 
travel ban and the return ban could only be enacted as “additional health 
measures.” 441  Whether such measures are permissible is highly 
 
 
434  Giorgio Agamben, Lo stato d’eccezione provocato da un’emergenza immotivata [The State of 
Exception Provoked by an Unmotivated Emergency], IL MANIFESTO (Feb. 26, 2020), 
https://ilmanifesto.it/lo-stato-deccezione-provocato-da-unemergenza-immotivata/. 
435  Quanguo 31 Shengfen Jun Yi Qidong Zhongda Tufa Gonggong Weisheng Shijian Yiji Xiangying 
(全国 31 省份均已启动重大突发公共卫生事件一级响应) [31 Provinces Across the Country Have 
Already Initiated a First-Level Response to a Major Public Health Emergency], XINLANG YIYAO 
XINWEN ( 新 浪 医 药 新 闻 ) [SINA MEDICAL NEWS] (Jan. 30, 2020), 
https://med.sina.cn/article_detail_103_1_77160.html. 
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questionable because the WHO explicitly discouraged states from adopting 
travel and return bans during the COVID-19 pandemic.442  
From the beginning, there were exceptions to the return ban. For 
example, selected “foreign employees essential for business operations” 
from selected countries could return to China. 443  But from March 28 
onward, these individuals had to apply for new visas—although they 
already held valid Chinese resident permits.444 Return was also conditioned 
on the foreigners’ ranking according to their relevance for China’s 
economy. 445  Moreover, these individuals could only enter the country 
through charter flights arranged by their national government and approved 
by Chinese authorities.446 Beginning September 28, these restrictions had 
eased. Foreign nationals holding valid residence permits in three categories 
(work, personal matters, and reunion) are allowed to enter China without 
applying for new visas. 447  These entry rules vary to a certain degree 
between local entities within China because additional regulations from 
provinces and cities like Shanghai can exist.448  
Second, many provinces and cities imposed additional restrictions 
on Chinese nationals returning from abroad.449 Wuhan forced a blanket 
fourteen-day quarantine on Chinese citizens entering the city from 
abroad. 450  International WHO law, in contrast, only provides for 
quarantines of returning individuals who are suspected of constituting an 
“imminent public health risk.”451 Blanket return quarantines for Chinese 
nationals could thus, again, only be enacted as “additional health 
measures.”452 Wuhan’s quarantine rules, however, cannot be justified as 
additional measures, because they violated several IHR stipulations. 
Wuhan required returning nationals to spend their quarantine alone and not 
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with their relatives, irrespective of whether they traveled together. 453 
Wuhan also forced citizens to quarantine in hotels or quarantine centers 
rather than at home and required citizens to bear the costs of this 
involuntary accommodation,454 against WHO law.455 Returning nationals 
had to bear the costs of COVID-19 medical treatment too if they lacked 
Chinese national insurance.456 Wuhan’s strict return quarantine had been 
nationwide endorsed by the central-level CCDC.457 Beginning in late July, 
the State Council’s Joint Mechanism took over regulating quarantine 
measures for incoming passengers nationally. 458  In exceptional cases, 
individuals may quarantine at home, and for seven days only. 459 
Nevertheless, they must provide several negative COVID-19 nucleic acid 
tests. 460  The state center has also provided a psychological plan for 
“reducing negative emotions” of individuals in return quarantines.461  
Altogether, China’s central and local authorities’ measures have 
created a new and expansive cordon sanitaire: around all of mainland 
China. 
CONCLUSION 
How should other countries react to China’s and Wuhan’s three 
public health cordons? By drawing a fourth, ideological cordon sanitaire 
around the P.R.C.?462 The answer is no. Further isolation can frustrate any 
serious analysis of Chinese crisis management and law in general. Rather, 
what the world needs is both transparency and earnest engagement with 
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both China’s and Wuhan’s COVID-19 prevention and control.463 Without 
unbiased legal research ad fontes, one can neither scrutinize China’s “total 
war” on the coronavirus,464 nor draw positive and negative lessons from 
it.465 
This article questions the common assumption that during crises, the 
P.R.C. simply centralizes decision-making.466 Rather, in fighting COVID-
19, the center explicitly favors a territorially differentiated approach that 
does not “cut with one knife,” i.e., that does not aim at a “one-size-fits-all” 
solution.467 This style of decentralization—treating “the whole country as 
a chess game” arranged and commanded by the center— 468  failed to 
prevent the COVID-19 outbreak in the beginning. However, through this 
“COVID-19 chess,” China’s central and local organs managed to control 
the pandemic afterward. This apparent success has led many to conclude 
that China’s COVID-19 management proved “superior” 469  to the 
“regulatory patchwork” in federal states, 470  let alone in supranational 
systems like the European Union.471 Consequently, several countries have 
emulated China’s strict pandemic measures “in a domino-like fashion.”472 
Even more, the WHO has praised China and Wuhan as “setting a new 
standard for outbreak response.” 473  However, the WHO’s appraisal is 
questionable in four regards. 
First, China’s coronavirus crisis management— as well as PHEs and 
other crises management—must be scrutinized in a holistic manner.474 In 
doing so, this article reveals that China’s “people’s total war” on COVID-
19 has produced detrimental effects for many individuals impacted by the 
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regulations.475 COVID-19 management in Wuhan encroached on myriad 
rights and freedoms of millions of individuals for several months. Even in 
relation to China’s aim of absolutely eliminating COVID-19, these 
encroachments stretched beyond the justified scope because they forget to 
balance pandemic containment with individual rights. 
Second, one important reason for this imbalance is China’s “chess-
style” decentralization. Chinese cities like Wuhan have the ability to 
severely restrict people’s rights without being held accountable.476 Neither 
can citizens directly challenge general and abstract municipal COVID-19 
(non-)law in court. Nor can citizens directly elect their municipal people’s 
congress nor government and thus change their cities’ future.477 Rather, 
they are subjected to the commands of the party and state at the provincial 
and central levels in a “democratic centralist” manner.478 
Third, federal systems are not necessarily inferior to unitary systems 
like China’s when fighting pandemics, and emergency situations in 
general. 479  As the examples of the United States, 480  Germany, 481  and 
Australia, demonstrate, a federations’ success in responding to COVID-19 
varies heavily.482 Australia has even managed to reach zero new COVID-
19—483 not despite of, but partially because of its “cooperative federalism” 
system.484 
Lastly, the WHO’s appraisal of China’s COVID-19 containment as 
“setting a new standard”485 mistakes the intentions of Chinese party and 
state leaders. For now, China’s leadership does not aim to provide globally 
applicable public health standards. Rather, they see China as a “paragon” 
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with “outstanding capabilities that cannot be achieved by other 
countries.”486 Chinese party and state leaders claim—and both domestic 
and foreign scholars repeat—that these “outstanding capabilities” result 
from the “Chinese characteristics” of China’s current governmental system, 
be it in public health and emergency management, 487  governance and 
legislation,488 cities and their central–local relations,489 (de)centralization 
and federalism.490 Unfortunately, this “sino-speak” often turns out to be 
Sinocentric and Chinese exceptionalism that frustrates the aim of unbiased 
analysis.491  
Therefore, instead of labeling Wuhan’s pandemic management as 
COVID-19 containment “with Chinese characteristics,” Chinese and 
foreign scholars and policymakers should recall a simple universal wisdom: 
One cannot “cut with one knife,” because there exists no “one-size-fits-all” 
solution. This holds true not only inside China and any other country but 
even more so between different states and territories, especially those with 
dissimilar systems. What has worked and failed in China and Wuhan 
“might not be directly transferable” to other countries and cities—and vice 
versa.492 Policymakers and scholars cannot simply “transplant” pandemic 
containment solutions into their own country or local entity without 
sufficiently considering their specific central–local, party–state, and 
political–legal system and context.493 However, what foreign policymakers 
and scholars can and should do is to take an unbiased look into China’s and 
Wuhan’s COVID-19 management to learn from that experience—both in 
the positive and in the negative. 
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